President Barack Obama’s visit to Myanmar (formerly Burma) on November 19th has the potential to reshape the strategic map in Asia. This first state visit by a U.S. President demonstrates the steady improvement in U.S.-Burmese relations over the past few years. President Thein Sein’s reform efforts that led to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 2010 and her subsequent election to parliament, the release of political prisoners, and the dissolution of the military junta in 2011 have paved the way for renewed ties with the U.S. This improvement in relations marks one of the early successes of the U.S. pivot towards Asia, which features the U.S. focusing additional military and diplomatic resources on the region to counter a rising China. The advancement of U.S.-Burmese relations will have profound strategic implications for China as it nervously watches the U.S. moves in the region.
U.S.-Burmese ties had been on a downward trajectory since the military coup in 1988, and the crackdown on the National League for Democracy after their decisive wins in 1990 parliamentary elections. Aung San Suu Kyi’s imprisonment and gross human rights violations were major causes in the deterioration of the relationship. The U.S. responded by imposing sanctions, banning imports, and downgrading diplomatic relations. As the U.S. disengaged from the ruling junta, neighboring China was moving in and gaining influence.
China became a leading trade partner of Myanmar and developed extensive diplomatic, commercial, and military ties. The relationship with Myanmar grew in strategic importance for both sides--Myanmar received extensive investment in infrastructure and its oil and natural gas sectors; China provided diplomatic cover at the United Nations and protected Myanmar from international condemnation. Military ties blossomed, as China provided Myanmar with fighter jets, navy ships, and training of military personnel. China received an ally in a region where it has numerous border disputes.
More critically, China gained access to Burmese ports in the Bay of Bengal, which provided it with the ability to project power and establish a military foothold in the region. There are conflicting reports on Chinese activities on Great Coco Island, but some suggest the Chinese established a signals intelligence (SIGINT) station to monitor Indian naval activities and missile development. Whether this is the case or not, the military relationship with Myanmar was close enough for the Chinese to project influence in India’s backyard. Additionally, China has assisted in the development of a port at Kyaukpyu. This is significant, as the Chinese are developing an oil and natural gas pipeline directly to China. This pipeline would enable China to import oil from the Middle East while bypassing the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese have feared that the U.S. would block Chinese oil imports in a crisis by closing the straits, and this pipeline would safeguard against this. As the U.S. and Myanmar develop closer relations, these Chinese inroads into Myanmar are under threat, and the potential strategic losses for China are serious.
What the Chinese leaders will find more concerning is the potential invitation for Myanmar to participate in the Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand. Cobra Gold is the largest and oldest joint military exercise run by the U.S. in Asia. The 2013 exercise will include staunch U.S. allies in the region such as Thailand, Singapore, and Japan. For a Chinese government that fears encirclement by Washington, the inclusion of Myanmar in U.S.-run military drills and the notion of military to military ties with a former ally on a once-secure border are a troubling prospect. The Chinese are already concerned by existing U.S. defense ties with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia, and the newly emerging ties with Vietnam and India; a military relationship between the U.S. and Myanmar would greatly upset Chinese leadership and military planners.
There are also numerous strategic benefits for the U.S. in growing closer to Myanmar. Primarily, the improvement in relations is an opportunity to separate Myanmar from its previous allies, North Korea and China. North Korea has provided arms to Myanmar for the past two decades, and there were concerns in the U.S. that these ties extended to nuclear weapons. As part of the normalizing of relations, the U.S. has requested that Myanmar cut military ties with North Korea. This is a condition that the Burmese leaders have agreed to in meetings with South Korean leaders. This will deprive North Korea of cash and further isolate their regime. By working to transform Myanmar from a military dictatorship dependent on China to an aspiring democracy with a more independent foreign policy, the U.S. will have experienced a net gain to the detriment of China.
America’s rapprochement with Myanmar is in its early stages. The reform efforts in Myanmar appear promising, and the developments since 2010 have set the stage for closer ties with Washington. The new American influence in Myanmar has already made one of China’s few allies in Asia into a less reliable friend. This change comes on the heels of China’s disputes with neighbors over the South China Sea and resistance from these countries to perceived Chinese high-handedness. These events demonstrate the success of the U.S. pivot over that of China’s attempts to be more assertive in the region; this provides Beijing with new headaches as the U.S. moves to become more involved in the Asia. Continued engagement with Myanmar could be a strategic coup for the U.S. For China, the transformation of a client state into a U.S. friend on its own border is a hindrance to its larger strategic objectives. It contributes to the Chinese sense of being strategically vulnerable and encircled. This forces China to devote more resources to its own borders at a time when it would like to be the dominant Asian power, and pursue its objectives in Central Asia and further into the South China Sea and Pacific basin. The Chinese have few good options to reverse this trend, and are watching the increased U.S. presence in the region warily. In the case of Myanmar, the American pivot to Asia is already yielding diplomatic and strategic benefits for Washington at the expense of China.
Vineet Daga is a Business Development Manager in the aerospace industry. He has a BA and MA in international affairs from The George Washington University.
Photo: Ohnwinhtut (cc).
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Myanmar and the U.S.: The Strategic Implications
December 21, 2012
President Barack Obama’s visit to Myanmar (formerly Burma) on November 19th has the potential to reshape the strategic map in Asia. This first state visit by a U.S. President demonstrates the steady improvement in U.S.-Burmese relations over the past few years. President Thein Sein’s reform efforts that led to the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in 2010 and her subsequent election to parliament, the release of political prisoners, and the dissolution of the military junta in 2011 have paved the way for renewed ties with the U.S. This improvement in relations marks one of the early successes of the U.S. pivot towards Asia, which features the U.S. focusing additional military and diplomatic resources on the region to counter a rising China. The advancement of U.S.-Burmese relations will have profound strategic implications for China as it nervously watches the U.S. moves in the region.
U.S.-Burmese ties had been on a downward trajectory since the military coup in 1988, and the crackdown on the National League for Democracy after their decisive wins in 1990 parliamentary elections. Aung San Suu Kyi’s imprisonment and gross human rights violations were major causes in the deterioration of the relationship. The U.S. responded by imposing sanctions, banning imports, and downgrading diplomatic relations. As the U.S. disengaged from the ruling junta, neighboring China was moving in and gaining influence.
China became a leading trade partner of Myanmar and developed extensive diplomatic, commercial, and military ties. The relationship with Myanmar grew in strategic importance for both sides--Myanmar received extensive investment in infrastructure and its oil and natural gas sectors; China provided diplomatic cover at the United Nations and protected Myanmar from international condemnation. Military ties blossomed, as China provided Myanmar with fighter jets, navy ships, and training of military personnel. China received an ally in a region where it has numerous border disputes.
More critically, China gained access to Burmese ports in the Bay of Bengal, which provided it with the ability to project power and establish a military foothold in the region. There are conflicting reports on Chinese activities on Great Coco Island, but some suggest the Chinese established a signals intelligence (SIGINT) station to monitor Indian naval activities and missile development. Whether this is the case or not, the military relationship with Myanmar was close enough for the Chinese to project influence in India’s backyard. Additionally, China has assisted in the development of a port at Kyaukpyu. This is significant, as the Chinese are developing an oil and natural gas pipeline directly to China. This pipeline would enable China to import oil from the Middle East while bypassing the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese have feared that the U.S. would block Chinese oil imports in a crisis by closing the straits, and this pipeline would safeguard against this. As the U.S. and Myanmar develop closer relations, these Chinese inroads into Myanmar are under threat, and the potential strategic losses for China are serious.
What the Chinese leaders will find more concerning is the potential invitation for Myanmar to participate in the Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand. Cobra Gold is the largest and oldest joint military exercise run by the U.S. in Asia. The 2013 exercise will include staunch U.S. allies in the region such as Thailand, Singapore, and Japan. For a Chinese government that fears encirclement by Washington, the inclusion of Myanmar in U.S.-run military drills and the notion of military to military ties with a former ally on a once-secure border are a troubling prospect. The Chinese are already concerned by existing U.S. defense ties with South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Thailand, and Australia, and the newly emerging ties with Vietnam and India; a military relationship between the U.S. and Myanmar would greatly upset Chinese leadership and military planners.
There are also numerous strategic benefits for the U.S. in growing closer to Myanmar. Primarily, the improvement in relations is an opportunity to separate Myanmar from its previous allies, North Korea and China. North Korea has provided arms to Myanmar for the past two decades, and there were concerns in the U.S. that these ties extended to nuclear weapons. As part of the normalizing of relations, the U.S. has requested that Myanmar cut military ties with North Korea. This is a condition that the Burmese leaders have agreed to in meetings with South Korean leaders. This will deprive North Korea of cash and further isolate their regime. By working to transform Myanmar from a military dictatorship dependent on China to an aspiring democracy with a more independent foreign policy, the U.S. will have experienced a net gain to the detriment of China.
America’s rapprochement with Myanmar is in its early stages. The reform efforts in Myanmar appear promising, and the developments since 2010 have set the stage for closer ties with Washington. The new American influence in Myanmar has already made one of China’s few allies in Asia into a less reliable friend. This change comes on the heels of China’s disputes with neighbors over the South China Sea and resistance from these countries to perceived Chinese high-handedness. These events demonstrate the success of the U.S. pivot over that of China’s attempts to be more assertive in the region; this provides Beijing with new headaches as the U.S. moves to become more involved in the Asia. Continued engagement with Myanmar could be a strategic coup for the U.S. For China, the transformation of a client state into a U.S. friend on its own border is a hindrance to its larger strategic objectives. It contributes to the Chinese sense of being strategically vulnerable and encircled. This forces China to devote more resources to its own borders at a time when it would like to be the dominant Asian power, and pursue its objectives in Central Asia and further into the South China Sea and Pacific basin. The Chinese have few good options to reverse this trend, and are watching the increased U.S. presence in the region warily. In the case of Myanmar, the American pivot to Asia is already yielding diplomatic and strategic benefits for Washington at the expense of China.
Vineet Daga is a Business Development Manager in the aerospace industry. He has a BA and MA in international affairs from The George Washington University.
Photo: Ohnwinhtut (cc).
