azakhstan—a Central Asian nation that has long been a crossroad between East and West—seeks to strengthen its position in the global arena. Amid the rising geopolitical tensions, the former Soviet republic aims to preserve its “multivector” foreign policy course, and develop close relations with “brotherly” neighboring states. But how will such an approach affect Astana’s relations with Russia and China?
In an attempt to increase its importance on the international stage—where relations between Russia and the West seem to be going from bad to worse—on 8 June 2023, Kazakhstan launched the Astana International Forum (AIF), a platform for dialogue addressing various global challenges. Interestingly enough, neither Russian nor Ukrainian officials attended the summit in the Kazakh capital. Instead, Astana hosted leaders of Central Asian nations such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which suggests that for Kazakhstan a regional cooperation could be one of the country’s top priorities in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, Astana is expected to pay special attention to the construction of the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), connecting China and the European Union via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. According to Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, this transportation route opens up new possibilities for trade and investments.
“The Middle Corridor will almost halve the time it takes to transport goods across the Indian Ocean,” Tokayev stressed while opening the plenary session of the AIF.
However, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route bypasses Russia, Astana’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and a member of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. Thus, Kazakhstan’s participation in this project might worry the Kremlin, although under the current geopolitical circumstances—where Russia remains isolated from the West and bogged down in Ukraine—Moscow will likely have to turn a blind eye to Astana’s plans to position itself as a crucial transit country.
Beijing, on the other hand, could be interested in Kazakhstan’s participation in the Middle Corridor project, given that the former Soviet republic is well placed to benefit from the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, the One Belt One Road is one of the reasons why Astana seeks to expand its economic ties with China.
“The Middle Corridor does not confront the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. The TITR could become part of it,” Alibek Kuantyrov, Kazakhstan’s Minister of National Economy told Diplomatic Courier, emphasizing that the Central Asian has already established a logistics center in the Chinese Port of Lianyungang, and that it plans to build a terminal on the territory of the Xi’an Dry Port.
Kazakhstan also seeks to expand economic and political ties with neighboring Central Asian nations. Tokayev sees his country as an “economic engine in and for Central Asia,” while for his Kyrgyzstani counterpart Sadyr Japarov the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are a “bridge between Asia, Europe and Middle East.” It was, therefore, not surprising that one of the major topics discussed at the AIF was connectivity in Central Asia.
The region undoubtedly plays an important role in Astana’s foreign policy. Kazakhstan, accounting for approximately 70% of the total foreign direct investment inflows into Central Asia, seeks to portray itself as a regional leader. But being a member and the founder of the Eurasian Union, Astana has to balance its ambitions to strengthen its positions in Central Asia with its strong economic ties with Russia. Given that around 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports to Europe go through Russian pipelines, and that Russia remains Astana's largest trade partner accounting for up to 40% of non-oil exports, the former Soviet republic did not join anti-Russian sanctions the West has imposed on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
“Military solutions and sanctions are not viable solutions,” Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko said on 7 June 2023 at a meeting with foreign journalists, pointing out that the Central Asian nation has been promoting diplomacy on the global scale for several decades.
But not joining anti-Russian sanctions does not necessarily mean that Astana will continue doing business with Moscow as usual. According to reports, Kazakhstani banks have started to block payments for servers, microchips, processors, telecommunication equipment, and other electronics from Russian entities. In other words, the Kremlin’s nominal ally is not allowing Russia to use Kazakhstan to evade sanctions. Given Russia’s weakened position in the international arena, Moscow does not seem to be in a position to force Astana to change such an approach. As a result, the Central Asian nation is expected to continue turning its back on Russia, although it is unlikely to radically change geopolitical course anytime soon, if at all.
Instead, Astana is expected to preserve relatively good ties with both of its giant neighbors—Russia and China—but at the same time it will seek not only to increase its influence in Central Asia, but also to strengthen its ties with the West and with major global institutions. The very fact that the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Astana International Forum clearly indicates that Kazakhstan will continue positioning itself as an important actor in the global arena.
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Kazakhstan's Growing Foreign Policy Ambitions
Image by Акимхан Бозтай from Pixabay
June 12, 2023
Kazakhstan is flexing its foreign policy muscles, balancing continued good ties with Russia and China with expanded influence in Central Asia and stronger ties with the West. Key to this is an initiative to set itself up as a crusial transit hub between Asia and the West, writes Nikola Mikovic.
K
azakhstan—a Central Asian nation that has long been a crossroad between East and West—seeks to strengthen its position in the global arena. Amid the rising geopolitical tensions, the former Soviet republic aims to preserve its “multivector” foreign policy course, and develop close relations with “brotherly” neighboring states. But how will such an approach affect Astana’s relations with Russia and China?
In an attempt to increase its importance on the international stage—where relations between Russia and the West seem to be going from bad to worse—on 8 June 2023, Kazakhstan launched the Astana International Forum (AIF), a platform for dialogue addressing various global challenges. Interestingly enough, neither Russian nor Ukrainian officials attended the summit in the Kazakh capital. Instead, Astana hosted leaders of Central Asian nations such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, which suggests that for Kazakhstan a regional cooperation could be one of the country’s top priorities in the foreseeable future.
Moreover, Astana is expected to pay special attention to the construction of the Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), connecting China and the European Union via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. According to Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, this transportation route opens up new possibilities for trade and investments.
“The Middle Corridor will almost halve the time it takes to transport goods across the Indian Ocean,” Tokayev stressed while opening the plenary session of the AIF.
However, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route bypasses Russia, Astana’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and a member of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. Thus, Kazakhstan’s participation in this project might worry the Kremlin, although under the current geopolitical circumstances—where Russia remains isolated from the West and bogged down in Ukraine—Moscow will likely have to turn a blind eye to Astana’s plans to position itself as a crucial transit country.
Beijing, on the other hand, could be interested in Kazakhstan’s participation in the Middle Corridor project, given that the former Soviet republic is well placed to benefit from the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Indeed, the One Belt One Road is one of the reasons why Astana seeks to expand its economic ties with China.
“The Middle Corridor does not confront the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. The TITR could become part of it,” Alibek Kuantyrov, Kazakhstan’s Minister of National Economy told Diplomatic Courier, emphasizing that the Central Asian has already established a logistics center in the Chinese Port of Lianyungang, and that it plans to build a terminal on the territory of the Xi’an Dry Port.
Kazakhstan also seeks to expand economic and political ties with neighboring Central Asian nations. Tokayev sees his country as an “economic engine in and for Central Asia,” while for his Kyrgyzstani counterpart Sadyr Japarov the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are a “bridge between Asia, Europe and Middle East.” It was, therefore, not surprising that one of the major topics discussed at the AIF was connectivity in Central Asia.
The region undoubtedly plays an important role in Astana’s foreign policy. Kazakhstan, accounting for approximately 70% of the total foreign direct investment inflows into Central Asia, seeks to portray itself as a regional leader. But being a member and the founder of the Eurasian Union, Astana has to balance its ambitions to strengthen its positions in Central Asia with its strong economic ties with Russia. Given that around 80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports to Europe go through Russian pipelines, and that Russia remains Astana's largest trade partner accounting for up to 40% of non-oil exports, the former Soviet republic did not join anti-Russian sanctions the West has imposed on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
“Military solutions and sanctions are not viable solutions,” Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko said on 7 June 2023 at a meeting with foreign journalists, pointing out that the Central Asian nation has been promoting diplomacy on the global scale for several decades.
But not joining anti-Russian sanctions does not necessarily mean that Astana will continue doing business with Moscow as usual. According to reports, Kazakhstani banks have started to block payments for servers, microchips, processors, telecommunication equipment, and other electronics from Russian entities. In other words, the Kremlin’s nominal ally is not allowing Russia to use Kazakhstan to evade sanctions. Given Russia’s weakened position in the international arena, Moscow does not seem to be in a position to force Astana to change such an approach. As a result, the Central Asian nation is expected to continue turning its back on Russia, although it is unlikely to radically change geopolitical course anytime soon, if at all.
Instead, Astana is expected to preserve relatively good ties with both of its giant neighbors—Russia and China—but at the same time it will seek not only to increase its influence in Central Asia, but also to strengthen its ties with the West and with major global institutions. The very fact that the United Nations was a strategic partner of the Astana International Forum clearly indicates that Kazakhstan will continue positioning itself as an important actor in the global arena.
