.

Eight years after the bloody civil war that split Côte d’Ivoire in two, hard fought efforts to unify the Government-controlled south and rebel-held north have once again crumbled. The November 28, 2010 presidential election, which drew 80% of the Ivorian electorate, was hoped to be a watershed in the painfully slow detente between the two sides. Hopes were promptly dashed, however, when incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power following internationally verified results declaring former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara the victor. In response to ensuing waves of protests and other attempts at his ouster, Gbagbo has supported state security forces, Liberian mercenaries and various militias in quelling pro-Ouattara groups; the latter have in turn massacred those obstructing their path to the presidential palace.

The post-poll conflicts have sparked an exodus of almost 200,000 refugees into eleven neighboring countries and displaced upwards of one million internally, effectively thrusting the country back to civil war. And recent reports of crimes against humanity are raising questions about whether the UN Security Council may respond as resolutely as it did to the Libyan conflict.

The Worst of Times, the Best of Times

Gbagbo’s intransigence could not have come at a worse time for international security and humanitarian actors. Less than three weeks following the West African election, civil disobedience swept across North Africa, culminating in Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, a Security Council-authorized military intervention in Libya and growing civil tension from the Fertile Crescent to Mount Sinai. Although Libya is the sole conflict in which UN-backed military forces have intervened, its attendant refugee crisis has exacerbated tenuous security conditions in Egypt and Tunisia, further compounding regional instability. Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to rebuild amid radiation leaks from nuclear reactors damaged by the tsunami that has put the combined total of those dead and still missing at 28,000. Between the refugee crises and war in North Africa, the growing likelihood of similar outcomes in the Middle East, and Japan’s unfolding disaster, international humanitarian and security actors are bogged down.

For Gbagbo, the string of emergencies has created an opportunity to further tighten his bloody grip on the reins of presidential power. Indeed, international attention shifted toward rising revolutionary tensions in December, just as Gbagbo’s violent campaign was taking form. By the time Tunisia and Egypt came under new leadership in mid-February, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) put the post-electoral death toll at approximately 300.

The most recent reports coming out of Côte d’Ivoire document a significant surge of deadly violence in which both civilians and UN peacekeepers have been caught. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported “some 50,000 people have been displaced by two days of fighting in the town of Duékoué, which was captured by pro-Ouattara forces.” Anywhere from several hundred to 800 have been killed, many of whom were innocent civilians. In the last week, UN staff and vehicles have been targeted by stone-throwers, at least six UNOCI staff members have been seriously injured, one UN member was killed by a stray bullet, and the FRCI fired at a UN helicopter. In response to the growing violence, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the UN, Youssoufou Bamba, went before the Security Council to plead for help. Arguing that “the world was witnessing a long-planned ethnic cleansing and genocide” by Gbagbo, Mr. Bamba demanded “rigorous” action from the Council.

The UN’s humanitarian and security arms have responded to the deteriorating situation in ways similar to its treatment of Libya. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) nearly tripled long-term funding for the refugee crisis and authorized $10.4 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the combination of which exceeds the amount pledged to Libya’s refugee emergency. On March 30, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1975, which imposes targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his close associates, empowers the UNOCI to “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,” “condemns in the strongest terms the recent escalation of violence throughout the country which could amount to crimes against humanity,” and demands Gbagbo to "immediately step aside." The Resolution’s threatening language resembles that adopted just prior to the authorization of a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya.

The Security Council’s Next Move

The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire contains many of the same elements that led the UN Security Council to authorize international military intervention in Libya: a recalcitrant despot refusing to relinquish power despite rapidly tightening Security Council sanctions; a growing risk that the situation could destabilize the surrounding region (several countries near Côte d’Ivoire are engulfed in conflict or have recently emerged from civil wars, including Liberia, which has been the destination of more than 150,000 refugees); and most importantly, an unprotected civilian population caught in the crossfire.

Although Council members adopted Resolution 1975 unanimously, most urged restraint by all parties involved and backed efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) to work toward a political solution. In other words, the Council is still seeking alternatives to authorization of another Libyan-like international military intervention. One reason is that political capital for such a drastic move depends largely on the success of coalition forces in routing Qaddafi’s regime. And even then, the Council must assess what kind of government will fill the vacuum. In the meantime, however, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is worsening, civilian casualties are rising, and broader regional stability is at stake.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Is Côte d’Ivoire UN’s next Libya?

April 4, 2011

Eight years after the bloody civil war that split Côte d’Ivoire in two, hard fought efforts to unify the Government-controlled south and rebel-held north have once again crumbled. The November 28, 2010 presidential election, which drew 80% of the Ivorian electorate, was hoped to be a watershed in the painfully slow detente between the two sides. Hopes were promptly dashed, however, when incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power following internationally verified results declaring former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara the victor. In response to ensuing waves of protests and other attempts at his ouster, Gbagbo has supported state security forces, Liberian mercenaries and various militias in quelling pro-Ouattara groups; the latter have in turn massacred those obstructing their path to the presidential palace.

The post-poll conflicts have sparked an exodus of almost 200,000 refugees into eleven neighboring countries and displaced upwards of one million internally, effectively thrusting the country back to civil war. And recent reports of crimes against humanity are raising questions about whether the UN Security Council may respond as resolutely as it did to the Libyan conflict.

The Worst of Times, the Best of Times

Gbagbo’s intransigence could not have come at a worse time for international security and humanitarian actors. Less than three weeks following the West African election, civil disobedience swept across North Africa, culminating in Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, a Security Council-authorized military intervention in Libya and growing civil tension from the Fertile Crescent to Mount Sinai. Although Libya is the sole conflict in which UN-backed military forces have intervened, its attendant refugee crisis has exacerbated tenuous security conditions in Egypt and Tunisia, further compounding regional instability. Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to rebuild amid radiation leaks from nuclear reactors damaged by the tsunami that has put the combined total of those dead and still missing at 28,000. Between the refugee crises and war in North Africa, the growing likelihood of similar outcomes in the Middle East, and Japan’s unfolding disaster, international humanitarian and security actors are bogged down.

For Gbagbo, the string of emergencies has created an opportunity to further tighten his bloody grip on the reins of presidential power. Indeed, international attention shifted toward rising revolutionary tensions in December, just as Gbagbo’s violent campaign was taking form. By the time Tunisia and Egypt came under new leadership in mid-February, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) put the post-electoral death toll at approximately 300.

The most recent reports coming out of Côte d’Ivoire document a significant surge of deadly violence in which both civilians and UN peacekeepers have been caught. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported “some 50,000 people have been displaced by two days of fighting in the town of Duékoué, which was captured by pro-Ouattara forces.” Anywhere from several hundred to 800 have been killed, many of whom were innocent civilians. In the last week, UN staff and vehicles have been targeted by stone-throwers, at least six UNOCI staff members have been seriously injured, one UN member was killed by a stray bullet, and the FRCI fired at a UN helicopter. In response to the growing violence, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the UN, Youssoufou Bamba, went before the Security Council to plead for help. Arguing that “the world was witnessing a long-planned ethnic cleansing and genocide” by Gbagbo, Mr. Bamba demanded “rigorous” action from the Council.

The UN’s humanitarian and security arms have responded to the deteriorating situation in ways similar to its treatment of Libya. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) nearly tripled long-term funding for the refugee crisis and authorized $10.4 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), the combination of which exceeds the amount pledged to Libya’s refugee emergency. On March 30, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1975, which imposes targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his close associates, empowers the UNOCI to “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,” “condemns in the strongest terms the recent escalation of violence throughout the country which could amount to crimes against humanity,” and demands Gbagbo to "immediately step aside." The Resolution’s threatening language resembles that adopted just prior to the authorization of a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya.

The Security Council’s Next Move

The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire contains many of the same elements that led the UN Security Council to authorize international military intervention in Libya: a recalcitrant despot refusing to relinquish power despite rapidly tightening Security Council sanctions; a growing risk that the situation could destabilize the surrounding region (several countries near Côte d’Ivoire are engulfed in conflict or have recently emerged from civil wars, including Liberia, which has been the destination of more than 150,000 refugees); and most importantly, an unprotected civilian population caught in the crossfire.

Although Council members adopted Resolution 1975 unanimously, most urged restraint by all parties involved and backed efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) to work toward a political solution. In other words, the Council is still seeking alternatives to authorization of another Libyan-like international military intervention. One reason is that political capital for such a drastic move depends largely on the success of coalition forces in routing Qaddafi’s regime. And even then, the Council must assess what kind of government will fill the vacuum. In the meantime, however, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is worsening, civilian casualties are rising, and broader regional stability is at stake.

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.