On Monday, June 6, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon convened a long overdue and much anticipated press conference for UN journalists. Long overdue because Mr. Ban had sidelined briefings with Turtle Bay’s press corps while touring the globe to pledge assistance and douse diplomatic fires sparked by a string of revolutions, civil wars and latent coups. Much anticipated because the SG had yet to announce his decision to run for a second term, which will commence in January.
The anticipation, however, consisted not in whether Mr. Ban would run again, but when he would at last confirm intention to do so. And what better place to spread the inaugural news than the Dag Hammarskjöld auditorium, where his spokesperson delivers daily press briefings, overflowing that Monday morning with reporters from every corner of the world.
Following a condensed recap of the preceding months’ travels, Mr. Ban got on with it: “This morning, I sent a letter to the membership of the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (UNSC),” he said, “offering humbly, myself for consideration for a second term as Secretary-General of the United Nations.”
Of the forward-looking, sentimental portion of the speech that followed, two sentences stood out: “There is only one solution to the generational challenges of tomorrow. That is to begin our work today: By standing for democracy.”
Hypocrisy Standing for Democracy
Appropriate sentiments, to be sure, from the standing leader of history’s only universally representative organization; and in many ways an accurate reflection of the UN’s work since 1945. But a glaring contradiction belied the Secretary General’s words: neither he nor any of his seven predecessors were democratically elected to the world’s top diplomatic post. And his bid for re-election has been virtually assured for months, probably longer.
The irony was not lost on his audience. Prior to posing questions, many alluded to the clinched victory by wishing Mr. Ban well in his next term. Others were more direct, congratulating his successful re-election. One reporter dismissed propriety, requesting comment from the newly confirmed benefactor of the hypocritical electoral process on prospects for its reform. Mr. Ban tersely replied it was an issue for Member States, and the GA had taken it up.
This answer, too, was expected because SG election reform lies with the GA--or at least begins there. The real power in SG selection lies with the Security Council (particularly its five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5), any one of which can derail the entire process) and thus poses the biggest obstacle to reform efforts.
GA “Attempts” at Reform
The GA has three times sought to define the boundaries of Article 97 of the UN Charter, which provides one vague sentence regarding SG election: “The Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”
The first attempt, resolution 1/11 in 1946, provided the basis for practices followed to this day. It established a renewable five-year term, required majority votes in the GA (by acclamation) and Security Council (including concurring P-5 votes), and recommended the Council, behind closed doors and by secret ballot, to nominate only one candidate for GA appointment. Ironically, the GA’s two subsequent reform resolutions have focused on paring back many of these powers.
From 1996 to 1997, after fifty years of self-imposed passivity in the election process (with the exception of a 1950 stalemate among P-5 members on the re-election of Secretary-General Trygve Lie, in which the GA intervened, extending his term through majority vote), Member States launched the contemporary SG reform debate.
Resolution 51/241 demanded aggressive change. Adopted shortly after Kofi Annan acceded to office, the resolution expressed GA desire to “make full use of the power of appointment enshrined in the Charter” by formalizing the practice of selecting a candidate based on regional rotation, giving “due regard” to gender equality in the selection process (though a woman has never been elected), announcing the prerogative of the GA President to solicit potential candidates from Member States and forward them to the Security Council, and emphasizing the need for transparency.
The first opportunity to implement these demands came in the 2005, as Kofi Annan’s two-term tenure was coming to an end. The most significant sign of progress that election season, which gave victory to Ban Ki-moon, was the high degree of transparency on the part of the SC president. However, no formalized agreements on continued transparency were established and some of his openness has since been attributed to leaks, neither of which bode well for future transparency.
The third and most recent attempt at SG election reform, resolution 60/286, followed Mr. Ban’s election. Largely reiterating the 1997 resolution, the 2006 text highlighted two themes: more transparency from the SC, and more input from the GA in deliberations. In light of Mr. Ban’s Monday confirmation, however, the requests outlined in 60/268 will not be put to the test until at least the end of his second term in 2016, when the next election cycle begins.
Election. Resolution. Repeat.
The General Assembly can continue to issue resolutions regarding SG election every nine years (or more frequently if it so chooses), but because they are non-binding the Security Council can continue to ignore them. So what is the point? In the face of entrenched UN norms, resolutions are mostly symbolic of the potential for change. But as symbols of emerging norms, persistent resolutions with consistent content (i.e. 51/241 and 60/268) can have the effect of isolating opponents (i.e. the P-5), with the hope of luring them to the negotiating table. Resolution 11/1 in 1946 is a testament to the strength of GA resolutions once reinforced through years of practice.
All that said, opaque secretive and centralized SG election practices serve a practical purpose: by affording the P-5 such a privileged position they help ensure that otherwise adversarial neighbors in the world community (i.e. the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, or the U.S. and China today) continue to work alongside one another in the UN system. The flip-side is that the face of the United Nations continues to be an individual whom five Great Powers have selected based on criteria largely unknown, other than that the candidate does not pose a foreseeable threat to their own national interests. Perhaps, then, Security Council reform would be a better starting point to the SG election debate.
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Irresolute Secretary General “Election” Reforms
June 15, 2011
On Monday, June 6, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon convened a long overdue and much anticipated press conference for UN journalists. Long overdue because Mr. Ban had sidelined briefings with Turtle Bay’s press corps while touring the globe to pledge assistance and douse diplomatic fires sparked by a string of revolutions, civil wars and latent coups. Much anticipated because the SG had yet to announce his decision to run for a second term, which will commence in January.
The anticipation, however, consisted not in whether Mr. Ban would run again, but when he would at last confirm intention to do so. And what better place to spread the inaugural news than the Dag Hammarskjöld auditorium, where his spokesperson delivers daily press briefings, overflowing that Monday morning with reporters from every corner of the world.
Following a condensed recap of the preceding months’ travels, Mr. Ban got on with it: “This morning, I sent a letter to the membership of the General Assembly (GA) and the Security Council (UNSC),” he said, “offering humbly, myself for consideration for a second term as Secretary-General of the United Nations.”
Of the forward-looking, sentimental portion of the speech that followed, two sentences stood out: “There is only one solution to the generational challenges of tomorrow. That is to begin our work today: By standing for democracy.”
Hypocrisy Standing for Democracy
Appropriate sentiments, to be sure, from the standing leader of history’s only universally representative organization; and in many ways an accurate reflection of the UN’s work since 1945. But a glaring contradiction belied the Secretary General’s words: neither he nor any of his seven predecessors were democratically elected to the world’s top diplomatic post. And his bid for re-election has been virtually assured for months, probably longer.
The irony was not lost on his audience. Prior to posing questions, many alluded to the clinched victory by wishing Mr. Ban well in his next term. Others were more direct, congratulating his successful re-election. One reporter dismissed propriety, requesting comment from the newly confirmed benefactor of the hypocritical electoral process on prospects for its reform. Mr. Ban tersely replied it was an issue for Member States, and the GA had taken it up.
This answer, too, was expected because SG election reform lies with the GA--or at least begins there. The real power in SG selection lies with the Security Council (particularly its five veto-wielding permanent members (P-5), any one of which can derail the entire process) and thus poses the biggest obstacle to reform efforts.
GA “Attempts” at Reform
The GA has three times sought to define the boundaries of Article 97 of the UN Charter, which provides one vague sentence regarding SG election: “The Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”
The first attempt, resolution 1/11 in 1946, provided the basis for practices followed to this day. It established a renewable five-year term, required majority votes in the GA (by acclamation) and Security Council (including concurring P-5 votes), and recommended the Council, behind closed doors and by secret ballot, to nominate only one candidate for GA appointment. Ironically, the GA’s two subsequent reform resolutions have focused on paring back many of these powers.
From 1996 to 1997, after fifty years of self-imposed passivity in the election process (with the exception of a 1950 stalemate among P-5 members on the re-election of Secretary-General Trygve Lie, in which the GA intervened, extending his term through majority vote), Member States launched the contemporary SG reform debate.
Resolution 51/241 demanded aggressive change. Adopted shortly after Kofi Annan acceded to office, the resolution expressed GA desire to “make full use of the power of appointment enshrined in the Charter” by formalizing the practice of selecting a candidate based on regional rotation, giving “due regard” to gender equality in the selection process (though a woman has never been elected), announcing the prerogative of the GA President to solicit potential candidates from Member States and forward them to the Security Council, and emphasizing the need for transparency.
The first opportunity to implement these demands came in the 2005, as Kofi Annan’s two-term tenure was coming to an end. The most significant sign of progress that election season, which gave victory to Ban Ki-moon, was the high degree of transparency on the part of the SC president. However, no formalized agreements on continued transparency were established and some of his openness has since been attributed to leaks, neither of which bode well for future transparency.
The third and most recent attempt at SG election reform, resolution 60/286, followed Mr. Ban’s election. Largely reiterating the 1997 resolution, the 2006 text highlighted two themes: more transparency from the SC, and more input from the GA in deliberations. In light of Mr. Ban’s Monday confirmation, however, the requests outlined in 60/268 will not be put to the test until at least the end of his second term in 2016, when the next election cycle begins.
Election. Resolution. Repeat.
The General Assembly can continue to issue resolutions regarding SG election every nine years (or more frequently if it so chooses), but because they are non-binding the Security Council can continue to ignore them. So what is the point? In the face of entrenched UN norms, resolutions are mostly symbolic of the potential for change. But as symbols of emerging norms, persistent resolutions with consistent content (i.e. 51/241 and 60/268) can have the effect of isolating opponents (i.e. the P-5), with the hope of luring them to the negotiating table. Resolution 11/1 in 1946 is a testament to the strength of GA resolutions once reinforced through years of practice.
All that said, opaque secretive and centralized SG election practices serve a practical purpose: by affording the P-5 such a privileged position they help ensure that otherwise adversarial neighbors in the world community (i.e. the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, or the U.S. and China today) continue to work alongside one another in the UN system. The flip-side is that the face of the United Nations continues to be an individual whom five Great Powers have selected based on criteria largely unknown, other than that the candidate does not pose a foreseeable threat to their own national interests. Perhaps, then, Security Council reform would be a better starting point to the SG election debate.
