ttending the climate COP27 in Sharm-al-Sheikh, Egypt, again demonstrated that the UNFCCC format is not fit for purpose. Instead of placing our hope on policies the international forum cannot deliver, we should be realistic about what COPs can achieve. A more productive role for the climate conferences would be to herald a state of global emergency, highlighting climate risks and guiding the shift towards ‘war economy’ planning underfed by financial reform.
There is something uniquely disappointing about going to COP. Granted, the climate conference is a particularly depressing farce when held in an unsustainable Las Vegas-style resort in the desert in a fossil-fuel powered military regime. (Or when planned in an extractivist autocracy under the auspices of an oil company executive.) But the disappointment is more intrinsic still: COP is fundamentally a convention of well-meaning people from all around the globe with the collective hopes of the world pinned upon them. And yet the UNFCCC meetings fail, over and over again–the last major agreement on mitigation was reached 2015 in Paris (subsequently not honored in policy) and virtually no agreements have been made since.
This disappointment is inevitable because we have placed altogether too great of expectations on the COP meetings. International negotiations between states, none of which are able to achieve net-zero emissions on time without significant reform at home, on principle cannot solve our conundrum. Even in the very best case, we should not expect more than a signal of mutual commitment to mitigation.
No matter how powerful, national leaders are still bound by hard economic constraints. The green transition is no longer the goldilocks scenario it once was. To meet the 1.5 °C or even 2 °C goal, we now need to decarbonize so rapidly that the transition will come with hardship. Even though renewables are cheaper than fossil fuels, reducing emissions for the entire economy is difficult. Europe has just felt the energy squeeze. In the developing world, there are real trade-offs between increasing living standards and reducing emissions as the ultimately better but more costly path. And those few states that possess the economic might to make a difference, the United States first among them, see themselves bound by other hard constraints such as great power competition for world order. Thus all actors see preciously little room to maneuver within their own climate policies. In a consensus-based process such as UNFCCC meetings, this is enough to stall any progress.
Rather than hoping for COPs to beat on against this current, perhaps we should focus on making the meetings a platform for international coordination on the state of our climate emergency. A focus on risks and adaptation cannot replace mitigation, but at the UNFCCC level it might prove more useful to encourage mitigation further downstream. For the UNFCCC to focus on risks is also in the interest of national actors, as it does not interfere with their responsibility and constraints but adds genuine value. We already know that climate chaos can render parts of the globe inhabitable, disrupt our food supply, and inflame conflict. Unlike empty and non-forthcoming promises on mitigation, the consequences of climate change can and need to be tackled internationally.
When we consider the stakes, it becomes clear that the closest analogy we have for climate change is war. In this analogy, COPs are to be the ‘high command’ in our effort against climate change. They can be responsible for forecasting and tracking, insuring against, and responding to the existentially threatening risks to planetary security. The establishment of a joint L&D fund is a crucial step in this direction. When set up, it will institutionalize financial transfers and incentivize states to take preventive action. Likewise the UN Climate Security Mechanism is an important foundation for a focus on conflict. For the UNFCCC to focus on these damages will be, going forward, both more necessary and more feasible than a constant mitigation stalemate.
By shifting attention to the climate emergency rather than annually repeating the same platitudes about measures everyone knows to be inadequate, COPs could prepare the ground for suitable measures. Giving more attention to the existential risks of climate change could alter the Overton windows in member states, making it easier to domestically argue for exceptional measures to cut emissions and transition to a green, resilient society.
Even more crucial is the need for COPs to ensure that nations’ financial resources are proportionate to the effort needed. In times of war, states are willing to invest enormous sums to accelerate production because they know it to be essential for their survival. Guaranteeing green development finance is the “logistics” responsibility of the climate “high command.” More finance for development is the only way to ease the economic constraints limiting climate action. Massive state investments and industrial policy will be necessary to incentivise the transformation towards green economies where the private sector is too slow to adapt. Just at this crucial moment, US monetary responses to inflation have caused a debt crisis for the developing world, most of whose debt is high-interest private debt. As proposals like the Bridgetown Initiative have shown, luckily we can still conjure up the financial resources necessary for transformation. Instead of crippling the developing world with high-interest private loans, we can reform the international financial regime and offer low-interest finance based on, for instance, the developed world’s special drawing rights at the IMF. With a great Keynesian New Deal on the global scale, we can finally create the room for state actors to decarbonise.
Without a doubt, this will require breaking many taboos of how politics have hitherto been conducted. COPs focussed on the climate emergency could help us advance towards these necessary changes. Rather than pitting states against each other in mitigation negotiations in which none can really make concessions, UNFCCC can provide the outline of a common mission. Monitoring risks and damages of climate change could help guide policy towards allowing resources adequate enough for the challenge. By recognizing the exceptional risks humanity faces in climate chaos, we will be more likely to take the exceptional measures needed to still prevent this catastrophe.
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Fight the Climate War to Prevent Climate Wars
Photo by Matthew TenBruggencate on Unsplash
March 3, 2023
We need to be realistic about what the COP summits can actually deliver rather than placing unreasonable hopes on their outcomes. Climate conferences should be focused on setting the financial stage for combating climate change rather than being where climate change is fought, says Jakob Gomolka.
A
ttending the climate COP27 in Sharm-al-Sheikh, Egypt, again demonstrated that the UNFCCC format is not fit for purpose. Instead of placing our hope on policies the international forum cannot deliver, we should be realistic about what COPs can achieve. A more productive role for the climate conferences would be to herald a state of global emergency, highlighting climate risks and guiding the shift towards ‘war economy’ planning underfed by financial reform.
There is something uniquely disappointing about going to COP. Granted, the climate conference is a particularly depressing farce when held in an unsustainable Las Vegas-style resort in the desert in a fossil-fuel powered military regime. (Or when planned in an extractivist autocracy under the auspices of an oil company executive.) But the disappointment is more intrinsic still: COP is fundamentally a convention of well-meaning people from all around the globe with the collective hopes of the world pinned upon them. And yet the UNFCCC meetings fail, over and over again–the last major agreement on mitigation was reached 2015 in Paris (subsequently not honored in policy) and virtually no agreements have been made since.
This disappointment is inevitable because we have placed altogether too great of expectations on the COP meetings. International negotiations between states, none of which are able to achieve net-zero emissions on time without significant reform at home, on principle cannot solve our conundrum. Even in the very best case, we should not expect more than a signal of mutual commitment to mitigation.
No matter how powerful, national leaders are still bound by hard economic constraints. The green transition is no longer the goldilocks scenario it once was. To meet the 1.5 °C or even 2 °C goal, we now need to decarbonize so rapidly that the transition will come with hardship. Even though renewables are cheaper than fossil fuels, reducing emissions for the entire economy is difficult. Europe has just felt the energy squeeze. In the developing world, there are real trade-offs between increasing living standards and reducing emissions as the ultimately better but more costly path. And those few states that possess the economic might to make a difference, the United States first among them, see themselves bound by other hard constraints such as great power competition for world order. Thus all actors see preciously little room to maneuver within their own climate policies. In a consensus-based process such as UNFCCC meetings, this is enough to stall any progress.
Rather than hoping for COPs to beat on against this current, perhaps we should focus on making the meetings a platform for international coordination on the state of our climate emergency. A focus on risks and adaptation cannot replace mitigation, but at the UNFCCC level it might prove more useful to encourage mitigation further downstream. For the UNFCCC to focus on risks is also in the interest of national actors, as it does not interfere with their responsibility and constraints but adds genuine value. We already know that climate chaos can render parts of the globe inhabitable, disrupt our food supply, and inflame conflict. Unlike empty and non-forthcoming promises on mitigation, the consequences of climate change can and need to be tackled internationally.
When we consider the stakes, it becomes clear that the closest analogy we have for climate change is war. In this analogy, COPs are to be the ‘high command’ in our effort against climate change. They can be responsible for forecasting and tracking, insuring against, and responding to the existentially threatening risks to planetary security. The establishment of a joint L&D fund is a crucial step in this direction. When set up, it will institutionalize financial transfers and incentivize states to take preventive action. Likewise the UN Climate Security Mechanism is an important foundation for a focus on conflict. For the UNFCCC to focus on these damages will be, going forward, both more necessary and more feasible than a constant mitigation stalemate.
By shifting attention to the climate emergency rather than annually repeating the same platitudes about measures everyone knows to be inadequate, COPs could prepare the ground for suitable measures. Giving more attention to the existential risks of climate change could alter the Overton windows in member states, making it easier to domestically argue for exceptional measures to cut emissions and transition to a green, resilient society.
Even more crucial is the need for COPs to ensure that nations’ financial resources are proportionate to the effort needed. In times of war, states are willing to invest enormous sums to accelerate production because they know it to be essential for their survival. Guaranteeing green development finance is the “logistics” responsibility of the climate “high command.” More finance for development is the only way to ease the economic constraints limiting climate action. Massive state investments and industrial policy will be necessary to incentivise the transformation towards green economies where the private sector is too slow to adapt. Just at this crucial moment, US monetary responses to inflation have caused a debt crisis for the developing world, most of whose debt is high-interest private debt. As proposals like the Bridgetown Initiative have shown, luckily we can still conjure up the financial resources necessary for transformation. Instead of crippling the developing world with high-interest private loans, we can reform the international financial regime and offer low-interest finance based on, for instance, the developed world’s special drawing rights at the IMF. With a great Keynesian New Deal on the global scale, we can finally create the room for state actors to decarbonise.
Without a doubt, this will require breaking many taboos of how politics have hitherto been conducted. COPs focussed on the climate emergency could help us advance towards these necessary changes. Rather than pitting states against each other in mitigation negotiations in which none can really make concessions, UNFCCC can provide the outline of a common mission. Monitoring risks and damages of climate change could help guide policy towards allowing resources adequate enough for the challenge. By recognizing the exceptional risks humanity faces in climate chaos, we will be more likely to take the exceptional measures needed to still prevent this catastrophe.
