.

For more than sixty years the UN Commission on Human Rights stood as the world’s chief forum for intergovernmental human rights advocacy--mainly because its globally representative membership made it one of a kind. But in the absence of proper checks and balances, that asset evolved into a liability: by the turn of the millennium it had become common practice for many of the world’s most oppressive regimes to exploit weak election rules to win seats on the Commission. A tipping point was finally reached by 2006, when critics of the status quo marshaled enough support for reforms.

From the ensuing 2006 overhaul emerged the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which, although significantly weaker than many reformers had hoped, shored up flimsy membership requirements in four important ways: first, the General Assembly (GA) was granted power to elect candidates nominated by their regional groups, in lieu of the latter simply appointing countries to the Council; second, candidates were required to make commitments and pledges the GA would have to consider during voting; third, “gross and systemic violations of human rights” committed by an acting member were henceforth subject to suspension from the Council by a two-thirds GA vote; and finally, the number of seats was reduced from 52 to 47 and redistributed among five regional groups: the group of African States (13); the group of Asian States (13); the group of Eastern European States (6); the group of Latin American and Caribbean States (8); and the group of Western European and other States (7).

The Limits to Cleaning up the Council

In spite of reforms, the practice of admitting unqualified candidates has continued: Ben Ali’s Tunisia served from 2006-2007 and Mubarak’s Egypt from 2007-2010. At present, Pakistan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Libya sit on the Council, though the latter was suspended March under the “gross and systematic violations of human rights” rule. On May 20, 2011, Congo and Kuwait (which replaced Syria, whose government has used lethal force to quell protesters in recent months) were elected to the Council. Freedom of the Press 2011, published by Freedom House, a rights advocacy group, ranked the media in all of the above “Not Free,” except Kuwait whose press is “Partly Free.” Also by Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011, which measures civil liberties and political rights, ranked all of the above “Not Free,” save Pakistan and Kuwait, graded “Partly Free” with a negative trend.

The primary reason rights pariahs are able to gain admission to the Council stems from a vestige of the Commission on Human Rights: “clean,” or uncontested, slates. Both Kuwait and Congo were elected on clean slates this year, which is to say they were one of four candidates running for four seats in their respective groups. Pre-2006, in the absence of a GA vote on nominations, each group essentially appointed its candidates. An important part of the 2006 reforms, stemming from the GA’s newfound electoral role, was the introduction of “competitive” slates, or nomination of more countries than the number of seats available.

Competitive slates are, as the name suggests, more competitive because the countries nominated are not assured a seat. Ted Piccone, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, noted recently that “In every case when regional slates have been competitive, i.e., more candidates than open slots, rights-abusing candidates have lost.  Competitive slates led to defeats of Venezuela (2006), Iran (2006), Belarus (2007), Sri Lanka (2008) and Azerbaijan (2009).” Nicaragua’s 2011 bid can be added to that list.

Reforming By Example

The newly reformed UNHRC has a mixed record. On the one hand, numerous authoritarian countries have joined its ranks. On the other hand, the introduction of competitive slates, as Mr. Piccone points, have prevented several such regimes from gaining entry. The problem, however, is that competitive slates are merely an option alongside clean slates, a fact not lost on regimes like Syria, seeking to win the political leverage a Council seat affords.

The hope of Mr. Piccone and others is that competitive slates will become the norm. Pedro Serrano, Ambassador to the EU, recently called “upon all regional groups to advocate competitive slates.” Britain’s Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant noted that his delegation is looking “at the whole question of membership and criterion of membership. The case of Libya shows that [clean slate voting] is an issue that needs to be discussed and reviewed.” On voting day this year, Hillel Neuer, Executive Direct of UN Watch, told the Diplomatic Courier that, “While nothing can prevent regions from privately colluding to fix clean slates, one could certainly direct regional groups to refrain [from doing so]...We understand that the US in 2012 intends to run in a competitive slate in the Western group, and that this could become a model and expectation for others.”

 

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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Cleaning Up the UN Human Rights Council

May 23, 2011

For more than sixty years the UN Commission on Human Rights stood as the world’s chief forum for intergovernmental human rights advocacy--mainly because its globally representative membership made it one of a kind. But in the absence of proper checks and balances, that asset evolved into a liability: by the turn of the millennium it had become common practice for many of the world’s most oppressive regimes to exploit weak election rules to win seats on the Commission. A tipping point was finally reached by 2006, when critics of the status quo marshaled enough support for reforms.

From the ensuing 2006 overhaul emerged the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which, although significantly weaker than many reformers had hoped, shored up flimsy membership requirements in four important ways: first, the General Assembly (GA) was granted power to elect candidates nominated by their regional groups, in lieu of the latter simply appointing countries to the Council; second, candidates were required to make commitments and pledges the GA would have to consider during voting; third, “gross and systemic violations of human rights” committed by an acting member were henceforth subject to suspension from the Council by a two-thirds GA vote; and finally, the number of seats was reduced from 52 to 47 and redistributed among five regional groups: the group of African States (13); the group of Asian States (13); the group of Eastern European States (6); the group of Latin American and Caribbean States (8); and the group of Western European and other States (7).

The Limits to Cleaning up the Council

In spite of reforms, the practice of admitting unqualified candidates has continued: Ben Ali’s Tunisia served from 2006-2007 and Mubarak’s Egypt from 2007-2010. At present, Pakistan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Libya sit on the Council, though the latter was suspended March under the “gross and systematic violations of human rights” rule. On May 20, 2011, Congo and Kuwait (which replaced Syria, whose government has used lethal force to quell protesters in recent months) were elected to the Council. Freedom of the Press 2011, published by Freedom House, a rights advocacy group, ranked the media in all of the above “Not Free,” except Kuwait whose press is “Partly Free.” Also by Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011, which measures civil liberties and political rights, ranked all of the above “Not Free,” save Pakistan and Kuwait, graded “Partly Free” with a negative trend.

The primary reason rights pariahs are able to gain admission to the Council stems from a vestige of the Commission on Human Rights: “clean,” or uncontested, slates. Both Kuwait and Congo were elected on clean slates this year, which is to say they were one of four candidates running for four seats in their respective groups. Pre-2006, in the absence of a GA vote on nominations, each group essentially appointed its candidates. An important part of the 2006 reforms, stemming from the GA’s newfound electoral role, was the introduction of “competitive” slates, or nomination of more countries than the number of seats available.

Competitive slates are, as the name suggests, more competitive because the countries nominated are not assured a seat. Ted Piccone, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, noted recently that “In every case when regional slates have been competitive, i.e., more candidates than open slots, rights-abusing candidates have lost.  Competitive slates led to defeats of Venezuela (2006), Iran (2006), Belarus (2007), Sri Lanka (2008) and Azerbaijan (2009).” Nicaragua’s 2011 bid can be added to that list.

Reforming By Example

The newly reformed UNHRC has a mixed record. On the one hand, numerous authoritarian countries have joined its ranks. On the other hand, the introduction of competitive slates, as Mr. Piccone points, have prevented several such regimes from gaining entry. The problem, however, is that competitive slates are merely an option alongside clean slates, a fact not lost on regimes like Syria, seeking to win the political leverage a Council seat affords.

The hope of Mr. Piccone and others is that competitive slates will become the norm. Pedro Serrano, Ambassador to the EU, recently called “upon all regional groups to advocate competitive slates.” Britain’s Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant noted that his delegation is looking “at the whole question of membership and criterion of membership. The case of Libya shows that [clean slate voting] is an issue that needs to be discussed and reviewed.” On voting day this year, Hillel Neuer, Executive Direct of UN Watch, told the Diplomatic Courier that, “While nothing can prevent regions from privately colluding to fix clean slates, one could certainly direct regional groups to refrain [from doing so]...We understand that the US in 2012 intends to run in a competitive slate in the Western group, and that this could become a model and expectation for others.”

 

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.