hina’s only extraterritorial naval base is in the Red Sea port of Djibouti. Rather than sending warships to the Strait of Hormuz, it is quietly emerging as a lifeline for Iran’s volatile economy.
As the White House exerts pressure on other states—specifically calling out China—to deploy naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, many have questioned whether China will answer that call. Not only do 38% of global crude oil supplies, 29% of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), 19% of liquified natural gas (LNG), and 19% of refined fuel products, flow through the Strait but roughly 85% of that heads to Asia. Yet the odds of Chinese naval engagement to reopen the Strait are extremely slim.
While the preservation of human life at sea is one of the foundational principles of international maritime law, the Chinese have a consistent track record of choosing their own interpretation of both human rights norms and international law. The Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) of 1972 obliges vessels to render assistance to other vessels in distress, but that requirement does not expressly apply to warships. Assistance is strongly encouraged by the law, but not mandated. This has been reflected in China’s tactical decisions in the region during the current Houthi campaign against commercial shipping, which has been ongoing since 19 November 2023. During that time, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at no point has provided security for the merchant vessels transiting the Red Sea. Nor has the PLAN rendered assistance to any of the vessels that were attacked. On several occasions (including in the 26 January 2024 Houthi attack on the MARLIN LUANDA that resulted in a major fire onboard) the nearest vessel to the merchant ship under duress has belonged to the PLAN.
There are several additional reasons why the PLAN may not have become kinetically involved, despite having a naval base on the Red Sea. The first relates to avoidance of operational or political blowback in the event something does not go well. This is always a possibility when armaments are flying. China’s prioritization of face is important to consider in how it engages with the world. The second is that the PLAN, despite its on–paper capacity, is hamstrung by bureaucratic command and control structures that limit the real–time operational decision making of commanders at sea. In other words, for a warship to be authorized to fight, it may need moment-to-moment instructions from Beijing, even if a Commissar is onboard. This would deter any commander from even risking a SOLAS response without clear permission from above. The third is a strategic notion that it is not the PLAN’s role to protect the “freedom of navigation.” While China is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which effectively codifies freedom of navigation, it expressly views that principle differently and thus does not feel a responsibility to uphold the concept in the way that the United States and the wider West do.
But the fourth reason is perhaps the most telling, though not mutually exclusive from the others. China was content to let the U.S., United Kingdom and European Union bleed themselves of armaments and treasure, defending ships in the Red Sea and still failing to stop the Houthi threat of attack. By contrast, China was able to negotiate tribute payments and safe(r) passage for Chinese cargoes through the Red Sea. Ironically, the Western powers largely ended up protecting Chinese shipments, as they were the main cargoes that still risked the Red Sea transits. China’s decision not to get kinetically involved is likely seen by Beijing as a strategic victory.
As the U.S. and Israel are now spending tens of billions on the war in Iran, China may once again see this as the most beneficial option for their overarching national interests. As a “competitor,” why intercede when your competition is wearing itself out? Proud of having hosted the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, China is far more likely to seek safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz through checkbook diplomacy and trade deals with the now less–sanctioned Iran. With Iran having just engaged in a BRICS naval exercise off South Africa in January, China may seek to extend new opportunities for Iran in that 11–country bloc that now accounts for 46% of the world’s population and which has begun using off-dollar payment systems for internal trades. Indeed, the new “toll” scheme for vessels coming through the Strait of Hormuz with Iranian permission and protection is payable in Chinese Yuan. In other words, the Chinese are willing to provide economic backing for Iran, even in the face of U.S. and Israeli attacks.
All this is to say that the U.S. Administration’s calculations are likely off if it expects assistance from China, as China sees strategic victory in supporting the Iranians rather than the Americans. China has perfected a “China–First” approach in a manner more extreme than the current “America–First” effort. While China may be harmed by the inaccessibility of trade through the Strait of Hormuz, China’s global relations and flexible rules for transacting business make it far more able to make up for that shortfall in supply. Additionally, it is well–placed to bolster Iran in return for special treatment. As such, it is highly unlikely that any Chinese grey hulls will join the United States in trying to overcome the consequences of the American and Israeli attack on Iran.
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China won’t send warships to the Strait of Hormuz; here’s why
Oman’s Musandam Peninsula, which extends into the Hormuz Strait. Image via Adobe Stock
March 30, 2026
The U.S. has called for China to deploy naval assets to help open the Strait of Hormuz. Dr. Ian Ralby explains why that’s unlikely to happen for several historical, strategic, and economic reasons.
C
hina’s only extraterritorial naval base is in the Red Sea port of Djibouti. Rather than sending warships to the Strait of Hormuz, it is quietly emerging as a lifeline for Iran’s volatile economy.
As the White House exerts pressure on other states—specifically calling out China—to deploy naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, many have questioned whether China will answer that call. Not only do 38% of global crude oil supplies, 29% of liquified petroleum gas (LPG), 19% of liquified natural gas (LNG), and 19% of refined fuel products, flow through the Strait but roughly 85% of that heads to Asia. Yet the odds of Chinese naval engagement to reopen the Strait are extremely slim.
While the preservation of human life at sea is one of the foundational principles of international maritime law, the Chinese have a consistent track record of choosing their own interpretation of both human rights norms and international law. The Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) of 1972 obliges vessels to render assistance to other vessels in distress, but that requirement does not expressly apply to warships. Assistance is strongly encouraged by the law, but not mandated. This has been reflected in China’s tactical decisions in the region during the current Houthi campaign against commercial shipping, which has been ongoing since 19 November 2023. During that time, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) at no point has provided security for the merchant vessels transiting the Red Sea. Nor has the PLAN rendered assistance to any of the vessels that were attacked. On several occasions (including in the 26 January 2024 Houthi attack on the MARLIN LUANDA that resulted in a major fire onboard) the nearest vessel to the merchant ship under duress has belonged to the PLAN.
There are several additional reasons why the PLAN may not have become kinetically involved, despite having a naval base on the Red Sea. The first relates to avoidance of operational or political blowback in the event something does not go well. This is always a possibility when armaments are flying. China’s prioritization of face is important to consider in how it engages with the world. The second is that the PLAN, despite its on–paper capacity, is hamstrung by bureaucratic command and control structures that limit the real–time operational decision making of commanders at sea. In other words, for a warship to be authorized to fight, it may need moment-to-moment instructions from Beijing, even if a Commissar is onboard. This would deter any commander from even risking a SOLAS response without clear permission from above. The third is a strategic notion that it is not the PLAN’s role to protect the “freedom of navigation.” While China is a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which effectively codifies freedom of navigation, it expressly views that principle differently and thus does not feel a responsibility to uphold the concept in the way that the United States and the wider West do.
But the fourth reason is perhaps the most telling, though not mutually exclusive from the others. China was content to let the U.S., United Kingdom and European Union bleed themselves of armaments and treasure, defending ships in the Red Sea and still failing to stop the Houthi threat of attack. By contrast, China was able to negotiate tribute payments and safe(r) passage for Chinese cargoes through the Red Sea. Ironically, the Western powers largely ended up protecting Chinese shipments, as they were the main cargoes that still risked the Red Sea transits. China’s decision not to get kinetically involved is likely seen by Beijing as a strategic victory.
As the U.S. and Israel are now spending tens of billions on the war in Iran, China may once again see this as the most beneficial option for their overarching national interests. As a “competitor,” why intercede when your competition is wearing itself out? Proud of having hosted the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023, China is far more likely to seek safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz through checkbook diplomacy and trade deals with the now less–sanctioned Iran. With Iran having just engaged in a BRICS naval exercise off South Africa in January, China may seek to extend new opportunities for Iran in that 11–country bloc that now accounts for 46% of the world’s population and which has begun using off-dollar payment systems for internal trades. Indeed, the new “toll” scheme for vessels coming through the Strait of Hormuz with Iranian permission and protection is payable in Chinese Yuan. In other words, the Chinese are willing to provide economic backing for Iran, even in the face of U.S. and Israeli attacks.
All this is to say that the U.S. Administration’s calculations are likely off if it expects assistance from China, as China sees strategic victory in supporting the Iranians rather than the Americans. China has perfected a “China–First” approach in a manner more extreme than the current “America–First” effort. While China may be harmed by the inaccessibility of trade through the Strait of Hormuz, China’s global relations and flexible rules for transacting business make it far more able to make up for that shortfall in supply. Additionally, it is well–placed to bolster Iran in return for special treatment. As such, it is highly unlikely that any Chinese grey hulls will join the United States in trying to overcome the consequences of the American and Israeli attack on Iran.
