.

For a second time Barack Obama and the Democratic Party won both the popular and Electoral College vote in the U.S. general elections.

This was a victory for the American left and Democrats, but it will ultimately prove detrimental for the U.S. overall. Not because Obama is essentially a bad president–I would even argue that he was a better prospective than Mitt Romney on paper–but rather because his victory was not one of ideology, but one of identity.

Unlike former President Bill Clinton, Obama has virtually no appeal in rural America, and this is a dividing factor for the country’s future. It was the Hispanic and African-American vote that kept Barack Obama in the White House. If the Tea Party fractured the Republican Party, then the emergence of ethnic minorities as king-makers in American politics–epitomized by the first black President in U.S. history–is very capable of breaking the Republicans in two. Mainstream Republicans regret the move to the right, but the far right is outraged at having compromised with the mainstream of the party twice while still losing the White House. Both McCain and Romney were mainstream candidates and both were defeated by a demographic tidal wave.

This will force the GOP into some tough and deep reflection. On one side will be neo-conservatives who advocate a move to the centre and will want to recreate George W. Bush’s Hispanic-friendly platform of ‘compassionate conservatism’. On the other side will be the paleoconservatives and libertarians who will hear none of this. Evangelical voters are less inclined to vote for big government and foreign interventionism.

Healthcare and welfare do end up benefiting disenfranchised urban segments of the population, as well as ethnic minorities; foreign interventionism will no longer be an effective campaign platform without a major terrorist event, which in turn will make this a priority only for neo-liberal and neo-conservative interventionists. This is, in fact, an important dilemma for Americans in general: a choice between nationhood and ideological empire.

In Europe this dilemma was sealed with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. Normative issues such as religion or ideology were left to the sovereign sphere of state authorities. Ethnically dissonant integration is difficult to this day, precisely because identity trumps values in every European nation. In Europe, the left is also associated with minority voters, but nationhood is a value which is rarely questioned, even when confronted by such entities as the EU. Europe’s centre right rejected the notion of multiculturalism when such personalities as David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Angela Merkel speaking out against the concept. Indeed Europe is the cradle of nationalism, and its foreign policy reflects it.

In the U.S. the issue was not a relevant one until the WASPs began to lose their demographic hegemony. Now, however, the ‘melting pot’ narrative is making electoral waves on the western side of the Atlantic as well.

This affects foreign policy in a significant way, as Europe demonstrates. Democrats are looking to pivot to Asia, while the GOP seems to wish to remain anchored to Europe and their Atlantic allies. President Bush encouraged Donald Rumsfeld’s Russophobe ‘New Europe’; Senator McCain argued for a more muscular American response to the Russian invasion of Georgia; and Mitt Romney not only spoke of Russia as an enemy, but also personally visited Britain and Poland during his campaign. But remember that Bush, McCain, and Romney were not paleoconservatives, and each sought to appeal to America’s center.

In fact, they share with the American left a vision of American exceptionalism as the indispensable leader of the free world. They differ only on the breadth of the scope: Democrats interpret freedom widely and look to international institutions for initiative in spreading that freedom, whereas the Republicans take a narrower view that only allows for Atlantic and Western interpretations of what that freedom means. However, both are ready to evangelize the world with it.

If exceptionalism had always been a part of America’s cultural DNA—including Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt advocating for a strong American presence in the world—it was the end of the Cold War that made such visions mainstream. The end of the Cold War was presented to Americans as a fruit of their country’s labor to contain Marxism. Ironically in so doing, America emerged itself as yet another ideological empire, albiet a liberal one.

Rallying behind an ideology helps justify ethnic diversity, as citizen identity is then primarily defined in terms of values rather than culture. The American dream, however, takes on a different tone when is touted by non-WASP Americans.

Both neoconservatives and liberal internationalists wish to define the U.S. by projecting its power abroad. Iraq and Libya may spell different models, but whether it is a ‘world safe for democracy’ or ‘responsibility to protect’, the urge to put values ahead of strict national interest will continue.

A national America in place of an ideological one may appear more parochial, but it would also be more stable and humble on the world stage.

The debate over the future of the Republican Party is crucial for the future of the United States and for global international relations in the 21st century.

Miguel Nunes Silva is Europe desk coordinator at the geostrategic consultancy firm Wikistrat, has been published in Small Wars Journal, TransConflict, and others, and writes regularly for the Atlantic Sentinel. He holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the University of Lisbon and a Master's in European Studies from the College of Europe.

Photo: the_raj (cc).

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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www.diplomaticourier.com

A Tale of Two GOPs

December 11, 2012

For a second time Barack Obama and the Democratic Party won both the popular and Electoral College vote in the U.S. general elections.

This was a victory for the American left and Democrats, but it will ultimately prove detrimental for the U.S. overall. Not because Obama is essentially a bad president–I would even argue that he was a better prospective than Mitt Romney on paper–but rather because his victory was not one of ideology, but one of identity.

Unlike former President Bill Clinton, Obama has virtually no appeal in rural America, and this is a dividing factor for the country’s future. It was the Hispanic and African-American vote that kept Barack Obama in the White House. If the Tea Party fractured the Republican Party, then the emergence of ethnic minorities as king-makers in American politics–epitomized by the first black President in U.S. history–is very capable of breaking the Republicans in two. Mainstream Republicans regret the move to the right, but the far right is outraged at having compromised with the mainstream of the party twice while still losing the White House. Both McCain and Romney were mainstream candidates and both were defeated by a demographic tidal wave.

This will force the GOP into some tough and deep reflection. On one side will be neo-conservatives who advocate a move to the centre and will want to recreate George W. Bush’s Hispanic-friendly platform of ‘compassionate conservatism’. On the other side will be the paleoconservatives and libertarians who will hear none of this. Evangelical voters are less inclined to vote for big government and foreign interventionism.

Healthcare and welfare do end up benefiting disenfranchised urban segments of the population, as well as ethnic minorities; foreign interventionism will no longer be an effective campaign platform without a major terrorist event, which in turn will make this a priority only for neo-liberal and neo-conservative interventionists. This is, in fact, an important dilemma for Americans in general: a choice between nationhood and ideological empire.

In Europe this dilemma was sealed with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. Normative issues such as religion or ideology were left to the sovereign sphere of state authorities. Ethnically dissonant integration is difficult to this day, precisely because identity trumps values in every European nation. In Europe, the left is also associated with minority voters, but nationhood is a value which is rarely questioned, even when confronted by such entities as the EU. Europe’s centre right rejected the notion of multiculturalism when such personalities as David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Angela Merkel speaking out against the concept. Indeed Europe is the cradle of nationalism, and its foreign policy reflects it.

In the U.S. the issue was not a relevant one until the WASPs began to lose their demographic hegemony. Now, however, the ‘melting pot’ narrative is making electoral waves on the western side of the Atlantic as well.

This affects foreign policy in a significant way, as Europe demonstrates. Democrats are looking to pivot to Asia, while the GOP seems to wish to remain anchored to Europe and their Atlantic allies. President Bush encouraged Donald Rumsfeld’s Russophobe ‘New Europe’; Senator McCain argued for a more muscular American response to the Russian invasion of Georgia; and Mitt Romney not only spoke of Russia as an enemy, but also personally visited Britain and Poland during his campaign. But remember that Bush, McCain, and Romney were not paleoconservatives, and each sought to appeal to America’s center.

In fact, they share with the American left a vision of American exceptionalism as the indispensable leader of the free world. They differ only on the breadth of the scope: Democrats interpret freedom widely and look to international institutions for initiative in spreading that freedom, whereas the Republicans take a narrower view that only allows for Atlantic and Western interpretations of what that freedom means. However, both are ready to evangelize the world with it.

If exceptionalism had always been a part of America’s cultural DNA—including Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt advocating for a strong American presence in the world—it was the end of the Cold War that made such visions mainstream. The end of the Cold War was presented to Americans as a fruit of their country’s labor to contain Marxism. Ironically in so doing, America emerged itself as yet another ideological empire, albiet a liberal one.

Rallying behind an ideology helps justify ethnic diversity, as citizen identity is then primarily defined in terms of values rather than culture. The American dream, however, takes on a different tone when is touted by non-WASP Americans.

Both neoconservatives and liberal internationalists wish to define the U.S. by projecting its power abroad. Iraq and Libya may spell different models, but whether it is a ‘world safe for democracy’ or ‘responsibility to protect’, the urge to put values ahead of strict national interest will continue.

A national America in place of an ideological one may appear more parochial, but it would also be more stable and humble on the world stage.

The debate over the future of the Republican Party is crucial for the future of the United States and for global international relations in the 21st century.

Miguel Nunes Silva is Europe desk coordinator at the geostrategic consultancy firm Wikistrat, has been published in Small Wars Journal, TransConflict, and others, and writes regularly for the Atlantic Sentinel. He holds a Bachelor's degree in International Relations from the University of Lisbon and a Master's in European Studies from the College of Europe.

Photo: the_raj (cc).

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.