.

A few years ago, Turkey was being hailed as one of the greatest success stories of the 21st century. A booming economy, marked by rapid industrialization, and a robust democratic system made Turkey the prime model of a Muslim democratic state. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey had been able to address the issues of the past and remove the military from the political equation. Erdoğan and his party's popularity had only grown over the years, and it seemed that a united Turkey was poised to enter into a dazzling future.

However, a year of massive nationwide protests have fundamentally changed this perception and brought a whole new array of problems into light for Turkey. Begun in May of 2013, originally to protest an urban development program that would remove the last "green" park in Istanbul, Taksim-Gezi Park, the violent, forceful removal of demonstrators would spark movements throughout other major cities in Turkey. According to rather conservative government estimates, 3.5 million Turks have participated in over 5000 demonstrations over the last year.

With the scale and sweeping nature of the Taksim-Gezi protests, many pundits in the mainstream media have tentatively dubbed the movement as "Turkey's Arab Spring." One year after the first sit-ins in the bustling Taksim Square, will Turkey undergo the same radical changes in government that so many of its neighbors in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region experienced?

There certainly are some similarities between Turkey's protests and the Arab Spring. Some have focused on Erdoğan’s increasingly anti-democratic and authoritarian ruling style, and compare Erdoğan’s rule with Mubarak’s. Although the military has been reduced in power and essentially returned to the barracks, many have argued that the police have become Erdoğan's own personal force. Finally, the increased censorship and recent bans of Twitter and Facebook are more characteristic of the military dictatorships that used to dominate the region.

But, despite how catchy the slogan "Taksim will become Tahrir!" is, there are major differences in Turkey that speak to a whole new type of protest emerging in the developing world.

For one, there are very few signs of Erdoğan losing his popularity among the general public. The AKP secured a plurality in the Turkish local elections this year, gaining about four percent of the electorate from the last election. Erdoğan's success is interlinked with his economic improvements, with Turkey still one of the top ten developing nations in the world. Under Erdoğan over the last decade, Turkey's GDP per capita has more than tripled.

In fact, these recent protests can be seen as product of Turkey's rapid development under Erdoğan's leadership. Konda Research and Consulting Firm and researchers at Bilgi University have found that the vast majority of the protesters are young, well-educated workers. According to the polls, over fifty percent of protesters have undergraduate or graduate degrees—and for a nation where the average citizen has seven years of any form of education, this represents a rather elite group. For most of the Taksim-Gezi protesters, creating sustained economic growth is not enough to satisfy. Instead, they are attempting to hold their government accountable for improving public services and expanding civil rights. The Gezi protests are a product of radically changing desires, fueled by the astonishing economic growth of the past decade.

While politics may play a part in the protests, they certainly are on the periphery. Most the demonstrators are politically unattached to a party, with polls showing that a majority do not even "feel close to" a political party or civil organization. Early in the protests, the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, attempted to take ownership of the movement and was quickly shot down. The youth of Gezi Park are characterized by their lack of unifying ideology and leadership, opting to work in cooperation to achieve notice from the government. When Erdoğan brushed the protesters aside as "çapulcu" or looters, the demonstrators adopted the term as their own. "Chapulling" in the popular lexicon now means fighting for civil rights and personal freedoms. The youth were more willing to unify under this adopted term than under any political umbrella.

Similarly, very few of the protesters are calling for the downfall of the government and a radical shift in Turkish politics. Only nine percent of demonstrators polled desired a replacement of the Erdoğan government. Instead, over sixty percent simply want the protection of rights and liberties by the government. The movement is pushing for a recognition of the problems and repression, not a complete upheaval of society.

The more apt comparison for the Gezi protests may not be Arab Spring, but the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011. Occupy was a movement more closely associated to class struggle in developed nations. However, both can be seen as urban youth reacting to developments that seem to infringe upon the public's freedom in an industrialized society. Both were leaderless and goalless, but simply a conglomeration of disparate individuals seeking change from an apparently apathetic government and societal elite.

Turkey is not the only developing nation undergoing these types of protests. Brazil, one of the BRICS and the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere, is also facing sweeping demonstrations of a similar style. Brazilians are tired of a government that pushes for mass scale neoliberal projects, the World Cup and Olympics included, with a seeming disregard for the rights and stability of the people. Tens of thousands of youth took to the street to fight against an increase in bus fares—a move that may help Brazil's economic future as it continues with large industrialization projects, but one that harms the urban individual and proves that the government is ignorant of the desires the public.

Never before have we seen this type of protest in quickly developing industrial nations. As Juvenal, the Roman philosopher, described, bread and circuses, or a good economy with plenty of jobs, is usually enough to satisfy the populous. The "The East Asian miracle" nations serve as an example of Juvenal's claim, with people willing to overlook violations of rights and freedoms due to rapid economic growth. However, these young mega-democracies are proving otherwise. While the results of these protests around the world are still to be decided, it is certain that the youth are quickly becoming a dominant force in politics and governments can no longer hope that economic growth will outweigh the youth's right to civic engagement and decent wages.

Akshan deAlwis will be attending Columbia University this fall as a John Jay Scholar. He has engaged with youth political participation programs in different parts of the world, including Turkey.

Photo: Mehmet Bilgin (cc).

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

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A New Type of Protest: The Taksim-Gezi Protests

June 19, 2014

A few years ago, Turkey was being hailed as one of the greatest success stories of the 21st century. A booming economy, marked by rapid industrialization, and a robust democratic system made Turkey the prime model of a Muslim democratic state. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey had been able to address the issues of the past and remove the military from the political equation. Erdoğan and his party's popularity had only grown over the years, and it seemed that a united Turkey was poised to enter into a dazzling future.

However, a year of massive nationwide protests have fundamentally changed this perception and brought a whole new array of problems into light for Turkey. Begun in May of 2013, originally to protest an urban development program that would remove the last "green" park in Istanbul, Taksim-Gezi Park, the violent, forceful removal of demonstrators would spark movements throughout other major cities in Turkey. According to rather conservative government estimates, 3.5 million Turks have participated in over 5000 demonstrations over the last year.

With the scale and sweeping nature of the Taksim-Gezi protests, many pundits in the mainstream media have tentatively dubbed the movement as "Turkey's Arab Spring." One year after the first sit-ins in the bustling Taksim Square, will Turkey undergo the same radical changes in government that so many of its neighbors in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) region experienced?

There certainly are some similarities between Turkey's protests and the Arab Spring. Some have focused on Erdoğan’s increasingly anti-democratic and authoritarian ruling style, and compare Erdoğan’s rule with Mubarak’s. Although the military has been reduced in power and essentially returned to the barracks, many have argued that the police have become Erdoğan's own personal force. Finally, the increased censorship and recent bans of Twitter and Facebook are more characteristic of the military dictatorships that used to dominate the region.

But, despite how catchy the slogan "Taksim will become Tahrir!" is, there are major differences in Turkey that speak to a whole new type of protest emerging in the developing world.

For one, there are very few signs of Erdoğan losing his popularity among the general public. The AKP secured a plurality in the Turkish local elections this year, gaining about four percent of the electorate from the last election. Erdoğan's success is interlinked with his economic improvements, with Turkey still one of the top ten developing nations in the world. Under Erdoğan over the last decade, Turkey's GDP per capita has more than tripled.

In fact, these recent protests can be seen as product of Turkey's rapid development under Erdoğan's leadership. Konda Research and Consulting Firm and researchers at Bilgi University have found that the vast majority of the protesters are young, well-educated workers. According to the polls, over fifty percent of protesters have undergraduate or graduate degrees—and for a nation where the average citizen has seven years of any form of education, this represents a rather elite group. For most of the Taksim-Gezi protesters, creating sustained economic growth is not enough to satisfy. Instead, they are attempting to hold their government accountable for improving public services and expanding civil rights. The Gezi protests are a product of radically changing desires, fueled by the astonishing economic growth of the past decade.

While politics may play a part in the protests, they certainly are on the periphery. Most the demonstrators are politically unattached to a party, with polls showing that a majority do not even "feel close to" a political party or civil organization. Early in the protests, the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party, attempted to take ownership of the movement and was quickly shot down. The youth of Gezi Park are characterized by their lack of unifying ideology and leadership, opting to work in cooperation to achieve notice from the government. When Erdoğan brushed the protesters aside as "çapulcu" or looters, the demonstrators adopted the term as their own. "Chapulling" in the popular lexicon now means fighting for civil rights and personal freedoms. The youth were more willing to unify under this adopted term than under any political umbrella.

Similarly, very few of the protesters are calling for the downfall of the government and a radical shift in Turkish politics. Only nine percent of demonstrators polled desired a replacement of the Erdoğan government. Instead, over sixty percent simply want the protection of rights and liberties by the government. The movement is pushing for a recognition of the problems and repression, not a complete upheaval of society.

The more apt comparison for the Gezi protests may not be Arab Spring, but the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011. Occupy was a movement more closely associated to class struggle in developed nations. However, both can be seen as urban youth reacting to developments that seem to infringe upon the public's freedom in an industrialized society. Both were leaderless and goalless, but simply a conglomeration of disparate individuals seeking change from an apparently apathetic government and societal elite.

Turkey is not the only developing nation undergoing these types of protests. Brazil, one of the BRICS and the second largest economy in the Western Hemisphere, is also facing sweeping demonstrations of a similar style. Brazilians are tired of a government that pushes for mass scale neoliberal projects, the World Cup and Olympics included, with a seeming disregard for the rights and stability of the people. Tens of thousands of youth took to the street to fight against an increase in bus fares—a move that may help Brazil's economic future as it continues with large industrialization projects, but one that harms the urban individual and proves that the government is ignorant of the desires the public.

Never before have we seen this type of protest in quickly developing industrial nations. As Juvenal, the Roman philosopher, described, bread and circuses, or a good economy with plenty of jobs, is usually enough to satisfy the populous. The "The East Asian miracle" nations serve as an example of Juvenal's claim, with people willing to overlook violations of rights and freedoms due to rapid economic growth. However, these young mega-democracies are proving otherwise. While the results of these protests around the world are still to be decided, it is certain that the youth are quickly becoming a dominant force in politics and governments can no longer hope that economic growth will outweigh the youth's right to civic engagement and decent wages.

Akshan deAlwis will be attending Columbia University this fall as a John Jay Scholar. He has engaged with youth political participation programs in different parts of the world, including Turkey.

Photo: Mehmet Bilgin (cc).

The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.