.
Despite the breakdown of an already fragile ceasefire, the international community seems to have given up on resisting the Russian quasi-war in eastern Ukraine. Instead, the US State Department is actively seeking to coordinate with the Kremlin in Syria and European unity over Russia sanctions is gradually fraying. Even beyond its occupation of Crimea and presence in the Donbass, Vladimir Putin’s government has kept up a multi-pronged campaign of lobbying, subtle intimidation, and provocation to influence events in Europe. For the most part, this campaign has successfully flown under the radar.
The easternmost members of the NATO alliance, such as Poland and the Baltic states, have been outspoken in their fears that military exercises in the region could quickly transition to kinetic operations, putting their territorial integrity at risk. Other than these countries, considered the most exposed members of the alliance, only Norway - which shares a small northern border with Russia - appears seriously alarmed by Putin’s continuing hawkishness. Back in June, the historically pacifist Nordic nation announced plans to boost military spending in response to increased Russian aggression in Europe. The NATO member’s announcement came a little over a year after Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin flouted a Norwegian travel ban by visiting the island of Svalbard. That wariness of Russian motives has influenced decision-making in Finland as well, with Helsinki stepping up its own cooperation with NATO and Foreign Minister Timo Soini diplomatically referring to Moscow’s provocations as an “essential change” for European security.
Much as was the case during the Cold War, the unwillingness of Western Europe’s key players to overtly confront Moscow is informed by a massive discrepancy in the balance of power. In a security review seen by the Times , the British army admitted that Russia’s firepower, advanced propaganda techniques and hacking technology would give Moscow a “significant capability edge” should the two nations ever find themselves at war. On the day the story broke, British Prime Minister Theresa May reportedly spoke with President Putin for the first time, pledging to do all she could to improve relations between the two countries. That marks a change of tone from her predecessor David Cameron, who was one of the more hawkish voices in the European debate over imposing sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. Other key members of the European bloc have been equally sanguine in their tone toward Moscow, including Italy’s Matteo Renzi and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
Of course, the conciliatory tones struck by May and Renzi don’t match realities on the ground. Earlier this month, Russia accused Ukraine of carrying out armed incursions and “terror” in Crimea (which Moscow has now occupied for two years). In response to the alleged threat, Russia has amassed as many as 40,000 troops along the Crimea-Ukraine border. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius described the allegedly fabricated attack as resembling the tactics of the KGB - fabricating a threat to justify future retaliation.
That move has raised fears a new clash may be imminent. Casualties have been rising steadily as fighting between separatists and the government in Kiev has intensified. At the beginning of August, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein told reporters that civilians were increasingly having to seek refuge in makeshift bomb shelters as a consequence of regular ceasefire violations. A raft of Russian military maneuvers in the area have been cast by some observers as psychological warfare, a tactic that also opens the door to sudden – perhaps even unintentional – escalation.
While stoking tensions along the Crimean border, Russia has more quietly been amassing considerable firepower close to its frontier with Estonia. The reason for this is unclear, but the fact that Russian military commanders have stationed an “air assault” regiment within spitting distance of the Estonian border has spread unease throughout the Baltics. In May, Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas called on NATO to station battalions in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as a show of “solidarity” in the face of rising Russian aggression.
When it comes to the Baltic states in particular, Moscow has a variety of tools at its disposal. Responding to the American-led missile shield project, the Russian military is moving to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to its Kaliningrad enclave within the next few years, while Russian-language organizations working in Latvia and Estonia receive funding from the Russian Foreign Ministry and have aroused suspicions that the Kremlin may replicate its narrative of “protecting Russians” in the Baltics. More subtle moves include the construction of Ostrovets, a controversial nuclear power plant by the Russian nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, in Belarus. The facility is located just 50 km away from Lithuania’s capital of Vilnius, and its construction has been plagued by a lack of transparency as well as multiple accidents that have been alternatively brushed off and covered up by authorities in Belarus. Among other mishaps, a 330-ton reactor was dropped by a crane during a test lift last month. In addition to rekindling memories of Chernobyl, those incidents have sparked considerable alarm among both Lithuanian officials and the European Parliament – which has pressed the European Commission over the need for the project to respect safety standards.
Of course, Moscow’s complex influence campaign is not limited to Europe. As the recent hacking of the Democratic National Committee and the murky ties between Russian interests and now-former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort show, Russia’s intelligence services are increasingly willing to deploy the same tactics they have long used in Europe to the United States as well. Given the overt desire for rapprochement expressed by multiple European leaders of late, that campaign appears to be paying off.
About the author: Frank Maxwell is a Competitive Intelligence Correspondent based in Warsaw, Poland.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
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Russia’s Other Inroads into Europe
August 25, 2016
Despite the breakdown of an already fragile ceasefire, the international community seems to have given up on resisting the Russian quasi-war in eastern Ukraine. Instead, the US State Department is actively seeking to coordinate with the Kremlin in Syria and European unity over Russia sanctions is gradually fraying. Even beyond its occupation of Crimea and presence in the Donbass, Vladimir Putin’s government has kept up a multi-pronged campaign of lobbying, subtle intimidation, and provocation to influence events in Europe. For the most part, this campaign has successfully flown under the radar.
The easternmost members of the NATO alliance, such as Poland and the Baltic states, have been outspoken in their fears that military exercises in the region could quickly transition to kinetic operations, putting their territorial integrity at risk. Other than these countries, considered the most exposed members of the alliance, only Norway - which shares a small northern border with Russia - appears seriously alarmed by Putin’s continuing hawkishness. Back in June, the historically pacifist Nordic nation announced plans to boost military spending in response to increased Russian aggression in Europe. The NATO member’s announcement came a little over a year after Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin flouted a Norwegian travel ban by visiting the island of Svalbard. That wariness of Russian motives has influenced decision-making in Finland as well, with Helsinki stepping up its own cooperation with NATO and Foreign Minister Timo Soini diplomatically referring to Moscow’s provocations as an “essential change” for European security.
Much as was the case during the Cold War, the unwillingness of Western Europe’s key players to overtly confront Moscow is informed by a massive discrepancy in the balance of power. In a security review seen by the Times , the British army admitted that Russia’s firepower, advanced propaganda techniques and hacking technology would give Moscow a “significant capability edge” should the two nations ever find themselves at war. On the day the story broke, British Prime Minister Theresa May reportedly spoke with President Putin for the first time, pledging to do all she could to improve relations between the two countries. That marks a change of tone from her predecessor David Cameron, who was one of the more hawkish voices in the European debate over imposing sanctions on Russia in response to its actions in Ukraine. Other key members of the European bloc have been equally sanguine in their tone toward Moscow, including Italy’s Matteo Renzi and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier.
Of course, the conciliatory tones struck by May and Renzi don’t match realities on the ground. Earlier this month, Russia accused Ukraine of carrying out armed incursions and “terror” in Crimea (which Moscow has now occupied for two years). In response to the alleged threat, Russia has amassed as many as 40,000 troops along the Crimea-Ukraine border. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius described the allegedly fabricated attack as resembling the tactics of the KGB - fabricating a threat to justify future retaliation.
That move has raised fears a new clash may be imminent. Casualties have been rising steadily as fighting between separatists and the government in Kiev has intensified. At the beginning of August, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein told reporters that civilians were increasingly having to seek refuge in makeshift bomb shelters as a consequence of regular ceasefire violations. A raft of Russian military maneuvers in the area have been cast by some observers as psychological warfare, a tactic that also opens the door to sudden – perhaps even unintentional – escalation.
While stoking tensions along the Crimean border, Russia has more quietly been amassing considerable firepower close to its frontier with Estonia. The reason for this is unclear, but the fact that Russian military commanders have stationed an “air assault” regiment within spitting distance of the Estonian border has spread unease throughout the Baltics. In May, Estonian Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas called on NATO to station battalions in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as a show of “solidarity” in the face of rising Russian aggression.
When it comes to the Baltic states in particular, Moscow has a variety of tools at its disposal. Responding to the American-led missile shield project, the Russian military is moving to deploy nuclear-capable Iskander missiles to its Kaliningrad enclave within the next few years, while Russian-language organizations working in Latvia and Estonia receive funding from the Russian Foreign Ministry and have aroused suspicions that the Kremlin may replicate its narrative of “protecting Russians” in the Baltics. More subtle moves include the construction of Ostrovets, a controversial nuclear power plant by the Russian nuclear energy corporation, Rosatom, in Belarus. The facility is located just 50 km away from Lithuania’s capital of Vilnius, and its construction has been plagued by a lack of transparency as well as multiple accidents that have been alternatively brushed off and covered up by authorities in Belarus. Among other mishaps, a 330-ton reactor was dropped by a crane during a test lift last month. In addition to rekindling memories of Chernobyl, those incidents have sparked considerable alarm among both Lithuanian officials and the European Parliament – which has pressed the European Commission over the need for the project to respect safety standards.
Of course, Moscow’s complex influence campaign is not limited to Europe. As the recent hacking of the Democratic National Committee and the murky ties between Russian interests and now-former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort show, Russia’s intelligence services are increasingly willing to deploy the same tactics they have long used in Europe to the United States as well. Given the overt desire for rapprochement expressed by multiple European leaders of late, that campaign appears to be paying off.
About the author: Frank Maxwell is a Competitive Intelligence Correspondent based in Warsaw, Poland.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.
