.
I

n early January, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Al Sudani, called for the United States troops' expulsion from his country. He referred to Operation Inherent Resolve, which the U.S. is leading to prevent ISIS resurgence with 900 troops in Iraq and 2,500 in Syria. Al Sudani's statement came after months of Iraqi Shiite militias targeting the U.S. troops. U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have been targeted with drones and missiles more than one hundred times since October 2023—including the most emblematic attack against the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The "Islamic Resistance in Iraq," a network composed of Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), appears to be responsible for the attacks. 

These tensions have intertwined with the Gaza war, with potential consequences for the whole Middle East. Over the last twenty years, Iraq has coped with a precarious balance between the external influence of Iran and the U.S. If Iran's role—operating through the support of local armed groups—becomes predominant, Iraq could become another proxy conflict in the current Israel–Hamas war. 

Washington’s response was an airstrike against the headquarters of these groups. President Biden said in a letter addressed to Congress that the reaction aligned with the U.S. foreign policy goals and national security interests. During the military operation, the U.S. killed Abu Taqwa, one of the heads of the Popular Mobilization Force, a coalition of Iraqi, Shiite–majority paramilitary forces.

The role of the militias in Iraqi politics increased in recent years, especially after Al Sudani needed their support to be elected as Prime Minister. Now, these groups are an influential bloc in its government and, according to some political analysts, have prompted him to declare the expulsion of U.S. troops. They are currently exploiting the situation in Gaza and in the Middle East to revive their older political goal of decreasing the Western influence over their country.

U.S. troops' expulsion would impact both Iraq's domestic politics and the Middle East region. As recognized by Al Sudani before the Gaza war, the U.S. support for Iraq is fundamental and "based on mutual interests." Al Sudani also told the Wall Street Journal that his country wants to maintain cordial relations with both the U.S. and Iran. As underlined by an anonymous Iraqi political source to The New Arab, "The Iraqi government and the political leaders … know that Iraq is incapable of making the U.S. its enemy because with one statement from the U.S. administration, the value of the Iraqi dinar will crash and the current regime will collapse."

A forced military disengagement would harm the Iraqi economy, which relies on oil sales revenues kept in U.S. dollars at the Federal Reserve. Every year, Washington transfers $10 billion of this amount to Baghdad, resulting in enormous U.S. political influence over the Middle Eastern country. In October 2023, for example, Iraq asked for a special transfer of $1 billion from the Fed that was denied because of the fear of illicit cash transfer to Iran. 

Furthermore, if the U.S. cuts its diplomatic ties with Iraq, other Western countries would do the same, resulting in diplomatic isolation for the Al Sudani government. Baghdad must be cautious towards this scenario, as some U.S.–aligned countries like India, Italy, Greece, and South Korea are the main destinations of its oil exports, a commodity that Western sanctions can block. 

The empowerment of the hard–line, Iran–backed groups will also increase domestic instability, primarily affecting foreign investments, which have increased in recent years. Even if Al Sudani has made some efforts to enhance the country's economic environment, this positive trend can reverse quickly in the shadow of past turmoils. 

Lastly, if the Islamic Resistance in Iraq or other Shiite militias increase power in the country, Iraq could become a crucial military player in the war against Israel, as occurring in Yemen or Lebanon. Baghdad's military efforts would probably not be directed toward Israel but rather toward the U.S. troops stationed in Iraq. Iran could use the Iraq crisis to pressure the United States, particularly during the presidential election year.

With the war in Gaza likely to drag on for a long time, the weight of every crisis surrounding Israel must be carefully monitored by the Netanyahu government and its Western allies. The more time passes, the more the conflict is likely to intensify the Washington–Tehran confrontation, which remains the unresolved issue in the Middle East since the 1979 Iranian revolution. 

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

a global affairs media network

www.diplomaticourier.com

Al Sudani’s call for U.S. troop expulsion strains U.S.–Iraq relations

Sandstorm in Iraq. Image by 12019 from Pixabay

February 5, 2024

In early January, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Al Sudani called for the expulsion of U.S. troops from the country. The call comes amid fresh attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, but if the U.S. leaves it could be ruinous for Iraq’s economy and diplomatic relations, writes Elia Preto Martini.

I

n early January, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed Al Sudani, called for the United States troops' expulsion from his country. He referred to Operation Inherent Resolve, which the U.S. is leading to prevent ISIS resurgence with 900 troops in Iraq and 2,500 in Syria. Al Sudani's statement came after months of Iraqi Shiite militias targeting the U.S. troops. U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have been targeted with drones and missiles more than one hundred times since October 2023—including the most emblematic attack against the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. The "Islamic Resistance in Iraq," a network composed of Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), appears to be responsible for the attacks. 

These tensions have intertwined with the Gaza war, with potential consequences for the whole Middle East. Over the last twenty years, Iraq has coped with a precarious balance between the external influence of Iran and the U.S. If Iran's role—operating through the support of local armed groups—becomes predominant, Iraq could become another proxy conflict in the current Israel–Hamas war. 

Washington’s response was an airstrike against the headquarters of these groups. President Biden said in a letter addressed to Congress that the reaction aligned with the U.S. foreign policy goals and national security interests. During the military operation, the U.S. killed Abu Taqwa, one of the heads of the Popular Mobilization Force, a coalition of Iraqi, Shiite–majority paramilitary forces.

The role of the militias in Iraqi politics increased in recent years, especially after Al Sudani needed their support to be elected as Prime Minister. Now, these groups are an influential bloc in its government and, according to some political analysts, have prompted him to declare the expulsion of U.S. troops. They are currently exploiting the situation in Gaza and in the Middle East to revive their older political goal of decreasing the Western influence over their country.

U.S. troops' expulsion would impact both Iraq's domestic politics and the Middle East region. As recognized by Al Sudani before the Gaza war, the U.S. support for Iraq is fundamental and "based on mutual interests." Al Sudani also told the Wall Street Journal that his country wants to maintain cordial relations with both the U.S. and Iran. As underlined by an anonymous Iraqi political source to The New Arab, "The Iraqi government and the political leaders … know that Iraq is incapable of making the U.S. its enemy because with one statement from the U.S. administration, the value of the Iraqi dinar will crash and the current regime will collapse."

A forced military disengagement would harm the Iraqi economy, which relies on oil sales revenues kept in U.S. dollars at the Federal Reserve. Every year, Washington transfers $10 billion of this amount to Baghdad, resulting in enormous U.S. political influence over the Middle Eastern country. In October 2023, for example, Iraq asked for a special transfer of $1 billion from the Fed that was denied because of the fear of illicit cash transfer to Iran. 

Furthermore, if the U.S. cuts its diplomatic ties with Iraq, other Western countries would do the same, resulting in diplomatic isolation for the Al Sudani government. Baghdad must be cautious towards this scenario, as some U.S.–aligned countries like India, Italy, Greece, and South Korea are the main destinations of its oil exports, a commodity that Western sanctions can block. 

The empowerment of the hard–line, Iran–backed groups will also increase domestic instability, primarily affecting foreign investments, which have increased in recent years. Even if Al Sudani has made some efforts to enhance the country's economic environment, this positive trend can reverse quickly in the shadow of past turmoils. 

Lastly, if the Islamic Resistance in Iraq or other Shiite militias increase power in the country, Iraq could become a crucial military player in the war against Israel, as occurring in Yemen or Lebanon. Baghdad's military efforts would probably not be directed toward Israel but rather toward the U.S. troops stationed in Iraq. Iran could use the Iraq crisis to pressure the United States, particularly during the presidential election year.

With the war in Gaza likely to drag on for a long time, the weight of every crisis surrounding Israel must be carefully monitored by the Netanyahu government and its Western allies. The more time passes, the more the conflict is likely to intensify the Washington–Tehran confrontation, which remains the unresolved issue in the Middle East since the 1979 Iranian revolution. 

About
Elia Preto Martini
:
Elia Preto Martini is a correspondent for Diplomatic Courier, covering European and Middle Eastern affairs. On Twitter: @epretomartini.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.