Following Yusuf’s death, Boko Haram’s deputy leader, Abubakar Shekau took the reigns and has capitalized on the population’s growing discontent with the government’s handling of Nigeria’s economic woes, now coupled with its inability to prevent the group’s increasingly brazen terror attacks. Boko Haram punctuated its threat on January 22 when gunmen and suicide bombers coordinated attacks on government and police buildings in Kano, leaving around 185 dead. The attack followed a string of bombings on Christmas day os last year that killed 35, along with numerous other bombings and attacks by gunmen plaguing the country the previous months since Shekau’s promotion to emir.
History shows that violence in Africa rarely raises eyebrows in the West, but the increasing inﬂuence of radical Islam in Nigeria has the international community on edge. One point of particular concern is a U.N. report indicating Boko Haram’s ties with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The report outlines the arrest of seven Boko Haram members traveling through Niger to Mali in possession of known al Qaeda member’s contact information. Though its clear that any coordination between Boko Haram may have with AQIM is in the early stages, communication between the terror groups certainly spells trouble for Africa and may help explain the increase in violence.
Though Boko Haram and al Qaeda-aligned groups share the same goals, there are many differences which make Boko Haram particularly concerning. Instead of aspiring to attack globally, Nigeria’s Islamic threat has a concentrated scope of attack that does not stray beyond the country’s borders. Their enemy has been clearly identiﬁed as the security and government forces of President Goodluck Jonathan and as it stands, they seem to be capable of being defeated. And although Boko Haram has sworn no allegiance to al Qaeda, the terror franchise has a vested interest in seeing Nigeria fail as a state and becoming a terror safe-haven à la al Shabaab in Somalia. From there, Nigeria’s geographic position would make all of North Africa susceptible to Islamic insurgencies itching to battle ill-equipped governments.
The election of Goodluck Jonathan as president in April 2011 was a catalyst for Boko Haram’s rise in Nigeria. Following Jonathan’s win, riots in the North lasted three days and left over 800 Nigerians dead. Since taking ofﬁce, his government has continuously to fail to halt the country’s economic slump or protect its citizens against attacks which further alienate Nigerians, in particular the Muslim population. Initially offering heavy-handed rhetoric promising strong military action against the terrorists, Jonathan has recently changed his approach in dealing with the group, at one point even admitting to having Boko Haram sympathizers within his administration. But in a recent interview has said he is open to dialogue with the group if they clearly identify their demands.
A shift in tone is a step in the right direction but may come a little too late for most Nigerians. Along with his inability to convince the nation that his government is capable of preventing attacks, Jonathan will certainly not persuade anyone with his replacement in leadership of the Nigeria Police Force. After sacking Inspector General Haﬁz Ringim following the January 22 bombings, Jonathan has installed Mohammed D. Abubakar as new Inspector General, who is best known for his ineffectiveness as a security ofﬁcial in Jos during bouts of sectarian violence in 2001 that resulted in more than a thousand deaths. Despite Abubakar’s resume, Jonathan’s administration indicated have no concerns for his handling of the violence in Jos and has proven himself in other unnamed assignments.
Given the rise in Islamic terror in Nigeria, the governments of U.S., Britain, and Israel have all expressed their willingness to assist Jonathan’s government and security forces with counterterrorism measures. But international assistance must be timely and calculated. The U.S. is all too familiar with showering corrupt administrations with ﬁnancial aid and the results it produces, especially those similar to Jonathan’s which admittedly has extremist sympathizers within it’s cabinet. Nigeria is clearly at a tipping point. The prospect of Boko Haram marginalizing the government, creating a security vacuum and ﬁlling it, grows more possible with each attack.
Wes Bruer is a writer and policy researcher based in Atlanta, Georgia focusing on foreign policy, international conflict, and terrorism. In 2011, Mr. Bruer spent the summer based in Cairo, Egypt writing about political and security issues in post-Mubarak Egypt.