The army has recently declared the squad as the foundation for decisive force, yet NATO calls for developing the true "civ-mil soldier;" Is this a doctrinal divergence; a difference of terms? Understanding needed capabilities is important. Understanding where is also important. Understanding the human environment has been a military quest in Afghanistan and Iraq. The creation of special teams such as Cultural Support Teams (CST's), Female Engagement Teams (FET), and Human Terrain Teams (HTT) is organizational proof for the need for this capability. Although much discussion still centers on definitions there is a clear divergence and [t]he definition established by NATO was sufficiently broad in scope to accommodate the various perspectives presented. However, this was also part of the challenge, with the established definition being so broad that the discussions often lacked the focus necessary to develop the foundations for a narrative that supported the intent of effecting institutional change.
Clearly, the strategic plan requires tactical unification and training this linkage across multiple skill sets will enhance the "Knowledge Sets" to implement this unification.
Organizations understand how to use the technology and all the tools of digital influence; do they understand the data to information to knowledge linkage? How to transform data and information to a "skill" and capability?
A recent MSNBC report on academic attrition of veterans would appear to indicate that although we have the technology, there has been a significant atrophy of critical cognitive skills. The military is not an academic institution, yet if the numbers in the article are representative of the military population, then the gap between military and civilian education is widening. This also appears to be the case as reported in the Decade of War lessons learned study by JCOA. Perhaps not so for senior levels of Professional Military Education (PME), but, it is soldiers, NCO's and Jr Officers that do most of the "interacting."
There have also been a number of articles lately on disruptive thinking over at the Small Wars Journal. Many of these articles look at this as a "gap" that needs to be narrowed in academic, business and military organizations. They pronounce that this knowledge and skill set will enable organizations to greater heights. But will this build agility? Resilience in your networks?
Looking at the trends of change, this disruptive thinking that wrenches organizations to new innovation occurs on the "fringe" of your networks, of your "Spatialterra," and not in your headquarters. The gap between process, innovation, and decision-making starts with identifying training in the interdependence of multiple "knowledge sets," and not just the tools of technology.
Corporate success is truly an effect-based approach. Percentage of market share and profit are the dominant metrics used to assess performance. Yet, many directives and policy appear to use pattern and trend analysis to produce either impressionistic or deterministic understandings; understandings that are linked up to the strategic vision but not linked down with tactical unification. Linking strategic vision with operational unification and objectives with tactical tasks is more than the difference between competitive intelligence and a business plan assessment. The eleven overarching lessons in the decade of war study clearly demonstrate this lack of tactical unification, and as importantly, the lack of training in these interdependencies. This is not just a military problem, but also a problem in civilian industry.
Assessments should inform and influence in both directions. Tactical unification requires a degree of flexible decentralization. Your operations, like your dynamic pricing and marketing campaign, is a mosaic of a strategic vision that is regionalized, even localized, to meet the specific nuances of your operating environment. It means having a layered contextual analysis. It means that your outliers, your "fringe," are probably on the cutting edge of what is locally, or regionally "disruptive" thinking and innovation.
For example, why do your tactical subordinates appear to argue that their personal analysis is more than just whim or opinion? Why do we use the data to question the theory, business plan, or perceived market reality? Should we instead, question the data or information? Social media, and social and digital influence is the norm. Like the Occupy Movement, it is here to stay. Narrowing the gap, and building a true civ-mil soldier means training interdependencies between tools, technology and human environment skills to obtain a "cognitive dominance." Narrowing the "gap" between organizations and institutions requires many levels of Ouroboros; the ability to re-generate and adapt to the new, it is what all organizations say they strive for.
Global interconnectivity means local-local relationships directly affect strategic direction. It is not enough to develop strategic policy as an instrument of top down change. Appreciating the nuance of the local environment, and developing the mechanics to influence and steer the social environment with tools capable of measuring impact and change, is an essential capability in the current operating environments. Social movements are no longer driven primarily by ideology, but are instead driven by the emotional reaction to information via social media exchange.
Big companies are treated differently from smaller companies
Generally speaking, if a person wants resources and stability they seek a large organization. If they seek innovation and entrepreneurship they look to small and private organizations in the Silicon Valley. Applying the elements of social and digital influence above, market segmentation/micro-segmentation is understood from this perspective:
Market segmentation on a global level that can be maximized offers the potential to expand influence and outreach capabilities into previously non-aligned or identified areas. Local-local relationships and influence on this level becomes a strategic concern/ outcome. To apply this to product sales, for example, being able to sell to a digital social network of 10 participants has little impact on sales. However, being able to develop an understanding of the social entry points and influencers as well as the common entry points and influencers, to a point where 1000 digital social network sites of ten people is now connected to a common product, local-local becomes strategically significant.
Market segmentation is a defining concept of the social narrative terrain. However, that does not necessary demand complex market segment analysis. Basic needs in emerging cultures are key points of entry and by themselves can address the basic criteria of market segment analysis: homogeneity (common needs within segment), distinction (unique from other groups), and reaction (similar response to market). Fundamental needs such as clean water, electricity, and food, can eclipse the analytical conventions of market segment analysis. A center point of influence is often achieved by addressing these most fundamental needs.
This enables a staff and local managers to analyze and produce assessments and make decisions that directly impact vision and design, but just as importantly, emphasizes tactical execution in context with the local operating environment.
The cost of failure for the military, business and academia is different, but arguably they are connected. Especially for the advocates of Unrestricted Warfare/Asymmetrical Warfare. Additionally, the goal is not to make each organization mirror each other but to synthesize and integrate strategy with tactical unification in a meaningful way.
Linking this vision with execution is embracing concepts you are already familiar with. It means planning to organize, organizing to compete, organizing to lead, and shaping the internal and external environment. It means that the CEO and the local crew is a "weapon system" and has the power to shape success or failure in everything they do. Additionally, it means that each one of these assets, and everything in between, has inherent limitations and strengths. It means that the weapon system you employ is an acknowledgement of some element of the economic-political terrain that requires shaping. The political terrain takes on gross dimensions when it involves not just managing local actors, but internationally competing governments and multi-national businesses. Geo-politics, the tactical implications of geo-politics, and how those assessments translate to operational and tactical execution can no longer be ignored.
The traditional methods of a hostile takeover, or corporate raid remain essential tools in the kit bag, but increasingly, the existential risk and threat to profit and loss comes from this widening gap between education, institutions, tools, technologies and the interdependencies in this "spatialterra."
Terry Tucker is a Senior Consultant for Spatial Terra Consulting Group, a Senior Analyst at the massively multiplayer online consultancy Wikistrat, and a Department of Defense Analyst.